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Dead Hands, Living Trees, Historic 
Compromises: The Senate Reform and 
Supreme Court Act References Bring 
the Originalism Debate to Canada
J. GARETH MORLEY*
Recent American debates about the relationship between the historic political compromises 
underlying constitutional provisions and their contemporary judicial application have 
been largely ignored in Canada. The Supreme Court of Canada has only twice referred to 
originalism—and never positively. But in two 2014 decisions about how central institutions 
of government—the Senate and the Supreme Court of Canada itself—might be changed, the 
Court relied on the underlying historic political compromises to interpret the Constitution, 
rejecting arguments from the text or democratic principle. In this article, I consider how 
Canadian courts have looked to history in the past and in the 2014 decisions, and I situate 
their approach within contemporary theories of originalism.
Les débats ayant eu lieu récemment aux États-Unis sur la relation entre les compromis 
politiques historiques qui sous-tendent les dispositions constitutionelles et leur application 
juridique actuelle sont demeurés largement lettres mortes au Canada. La Cour suprême du 
Canada n’a fait référence qu’à deux reprises à l’originalisme, et jamais de manière positive. 
Toutefois, à l’occasion de deux jugements de 2014 sur la manière dont pourraient être 
réformées deux grandes institutions canadiennes—le Sénat et la Cour suprême elle-même—
la Cour s’est fondée sur les compromis politiques historiques qui la sous-tendent pour 
interpréter la constitution, rejetant des arguments provenant du texte ou du principe 
démocratique. J’examine dans cet article la manière dont les tribunaux canadiens 
interprètent le contexte historique et les jugements de 2014, et je situe leur approche dans le 
cadre des théories contemporaines de l’originalisme.
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CANADA BORROWED FEDERALISM1 AND LATER AN ENTRENCHED and judicially 
enforceable bill of rights2 from its southern neighbour. From the beginning, 
American developments have had a profound impact in Canadian constitutional 
law, both as negative precedents to be avoided and as positive ones to be 
embraced. But the most fertile and contentious American constitutional debate 
of the last generation—the debate about originalism as a theory of constitutional 
interpretation—has been essentially ignored in Canada. The result is that a 
Canadian understanding of the relationship between the historical meaning of 
the terms of a constitution and its contemporary application remains trapped 
in antitheses dating from the early 1980s: The “framers’ intent” is contrasted 
with a “progressive”3 and “purposive”4 reading, and the assumption is made 
that readings that give much weight to history and political compromise will be 
weaker and more conservative than those that emphasize philosophical inquiry 
or proportionality analysis. This assumption is held both by those who think that 
1. US Const art I, § 8 [US Constitution]; Constitution Act, 1867 (UK), 30 & 31 Vict, c 3, 
reprinted in RSC 1985, App II, No 5, ss 91-92 [Constitution Act, 1867]. Where I refer to 
pre-1982 jurisprudence or commentary, I use British North America Act [BNA Act].
2. US Const amend I-X; Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms [Charter], Part I of 
the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, 
c 11 [Constitution Act, 1982].
3. Reference re Same-Sex Marriage, 2004 SCC 79 at paras 22-24, 29, [2004] 3 SCR 698; 
Reference re Employment Insurance Act (Can), ss 22 and 23, 2005 SCC 56 at paras 9-10, 
[2005] 2 SCR 669 [Employment Insurance Act Reference].
4. Hunter v Southam Inc, [1984] 2 SCR 145 at 156, [1984] SCJ No 36 [Hunter].
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a more active and progressive Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) is good,5 and by 
those who consider it bad.6
The 2014 SCC decisions in the Supreme Court Act Reference7 and the Senate 
Reform Reference8 should cause us to rethink these conventional oppositions and 
consider what the implications of the American originalism debate may be for 
Canadian constitutional jurisprudence. In both cases, the SCC relied heavily on 
history and the dynamics of political compromise in arriving at its conclusions. 
Both cases created robust constraints on the ability of the federal Parliament 
to unilaterally reform central institutions of government. Perhaps, given all 
the American ink spilled over the relationship between history and current 
constitutional adjudication in the debate over originalism, we should turn south 
for some reference points.
American constitutional commentary and jurisprudence are increasingly 
obsessed with arguments about the relationship between the historical meaning 
of the provisions of the US Constitution and its contemporary application. 
Should constitutional provisions be interpreted as their framers intended them? 
Should they be interpreted as their ratifiers would have understood them? 
Is there a distinction between the semantic meaning of constitutional provisions 
and their application in a particular case? What, specifically, does history tell us 
about the meanings of resonant but abstract phrases like “commerce among the 
several States,” “freedom of speech,” “cruel and unusual punishment,” or “due 
process of law”?
The academic literature on originalism is increasingly sophisticated. There are 
no longer just conservative “original-intent” originalists,9 but also public-meaning 
5. David Beatty, Constitutional Law in Theory and Practice (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 1995) at 65 [Beatty, Constitutional Law] (“[R]ight from the beginning, the judges 
recognized that to keep the Charter relevant and responsive to the role that it was expected 
to play, they should flesh out its meaning with an eye to the future rather than glancing 
backward to the past”).
6. Bradley W Miller, “Beguiled by Metaphors: The ‘Living Tree’ and Originalist Constitutional 
Interpretation in Canada” (2009) 22:2 Can JL & Jur 331.
7. Reference re Supreme Court Act, ss 5 and 6, 2014 SCC 21, [2014] 1 SCR 433 [Supreme Court 
Act Reference].
8. Reference re Senate Reform, 2014 SCC 32, [2014] 1 SCR 704 [Senate Reform Reference].
9. Robert H Bork, “Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems” 
(1971–1972) 47:1 Ind LJ 1.
(2016) 53 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL748
originalists,10 semantic orginalists,11 new orginalists,12 original-methods 
originalists13 and progressive living originalists.14 This ferment has had little effect 
north of the 49th parallel. Only one SCC justice, Ian Binnie, has even attempted 
to grapple with the American originalism literature, and he rejected it.15 The 
conventional wisdom is that Canadian constitutional interpretation eschews a 
backward look at history in favour of a progressive and evolving approach that 
concerns itself solely with contemporary social needs.16 This, it is sometimes 
suggested, is what it means to say the Constitution is a “living tree.”17 But the 
two 2014 References should cause us to rethink the relevance of originalism to 
Canadian constitutional interpretation.
In the Supreme Court Act Reference, the Court considered two issues. First, 
did the statute constituting the SCC permit the appointment of a Federal Court 
justice to one of the seats reserved for Quebec? Second, could Parliament amend 
the statute to ‘clarify’ that this sort of appointment was permitted without 
triggering the requirement for a unanimous constitutional amendment under 
paragraph 41(d) of the Constitution Act, 1982?18 These issues, especially the 
second, brought the fundamental question of the constitutional status of the 
SCC—a question that had divided leading constitutional academics for many 
years—before the Court itself for the first time since 1982. A scant five weeks later, 
the Senate Reform Reference considered how a number of reforms to the Senate 
10. Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1997) [Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation].
11. Lawrence B Solum, “Semantic Originalism” Illinois Public Law Research Paper No 07-24 
(2008), online: Social Science Research Network <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1120244>.
12. Keith Whittington, “The New Originalism” (2004) 2:2 Geo JL & Pub Pol’y 599 
[Whittington, “The New Originalism”].
13. John O McGinnis & Michael Rappaport, “Original Interpretive Principles as the Core of 
Originalism” (2007) 24:2 Const Commentary 371.
14. Jack M Balkin, Living Originalism (Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press of Harvard University 
Press, 2011) [Balkin, Living Originalism].
15. Ian Binnie, “Constitutional Interpretation and Original Intent” (2004) 23 Sup Ct L Rev (2d) 
345 at 373. He states that the “more nuanced” version of originalism advocated by Justice 
Scalia is “to be preferred” to the version he is rejecting. As will be described in Part II, below, 
Justice Scalia’s views would not be considered unusually nuanced among “new originalists” in 
the United States today. What Justice Binnie rejected, therefore, is not new originalism.
16. According to Peter Hogg, “Originalism has never enjoyed any significant support in 
Canada.” Peter W Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 5th ed, loose-leaf (Toronto: 
Thomson Carswell, 2015-Rel 1), c 60.1(e) [Hogg, Constitutional Law, 5th].
17. Reference re British North America Act, 1867 s 24, [1930] AC 124 at 136, [1930] 1 DLR 98 
(PC) [Edwards].
18. Supreme Court Act Reference, supra note 7 at para 2.
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might be accomplished, including introduction of fixed terms, consultations with 
the populations of the provinces and territories before senators were appointed, 
elimination of property qualifications for Senators, and outright abolition of the 
upper house.19 The federal government argued Parliament could accomplish all 
the reforms except abolition on its own.20 Once again, the Court confronted 
fundamental questions raised by the 1982 constitutional instrument but left 
dormant through the intervening generation.
What was at stake in both cases was whether the federal Parliament could 
make significant changes to national institutions without seeking provincial 
consent. The federal government advanced strong textual arguments that it could. 
But the SCC drew on history to reject the federal claim as formalistic. The central 
theme of the Court’s responses was the identification of historic compromises: 
the framework of the Senate set in 1867 as part of the original Confederation 
deal;21 the composition of the SCC set in 1875, as part of a broader compromise 
between Quebec’s needs in relation to its distinct legal system and the needs of 
the common law provinces;22 and the constitutional amending formula, which 
was a major component of the patriation compromise made in November 1981 
between the federal government and the provinces other than Quebec.23 As the 
Court pointed out in the Supreme Court Act Reference, the amending formula 
was the product of an earlier compromise in April 1981 among eight of the 
provinces—the ‘Gang of Eight’—including Quebec.24
If, as I will argue, history was determinative in two of the most important 
cases on the structural (as opposed to rights-guaranteeing) Constitution in a 
generation, what lessons are there for the theory of constitutional interpretation? 
Does this emphasis on the history of adoption mean we have to abandon 
purposive and progressive interpretation? Or is history just one more factor 
to be considered with the others? This article will consider how Canadian 
constitutional jurisprudence has used the history of adoption in the past, how 
that approach was disrupted by the collision of the 1982 Constitution with the 
conservative “original intent” school of originalism of the same time period, and 
19. Senate Reform Reference, supra note 8 at para 2.
20. Ibid at paras 51, 72, 85, 96.
21. Ibid at para 15.
22. Supreme Court Act Reference, supra note 7 at para 48.
23. Ibid at para 101; Senate Reform Reference, supra note 8 at paras 29-31.
24. Supreme Court Act Reference, supra note 7 at para 92.
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how this collision may evolve into a constructive relationship between a Canadian 
jurisprudence facing new questions and a more sophisticated originalist theory.25
I. THE USE OF HISTORY IN CANADIAN CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW AND THE COLLISION WITH THE AMERICAN 
ORIGINALISM WARS: 1867–1990
The judicial power in a constitutional case is to overturn political decisions based 
on the meaning of words. If a case is interesting and important enough to get to 
an appellate court, that meaning is unlikely to be obvious. It is difficult to defend 
the legitimacy of an undemocratic institution, the judiciary, overturning those of 
a more democratic one, the legislature, based only on will. This difficulty gives 
rise to a demand for politically neutral accounts of how a conscientious judge 
ought to go about turning the abstract and general words of a constitutional 
text into decisions in concrete cases.26 One of the most important issues is what 
weight, if any, the judge should give to the political reasons that underlay the 
text’s creation in the first place.
Canadian constitutional interpretation started off without much in the 
way of theoretical baggage. The BNA Act was a statute of the Parliament of the 
United Kingdom. Even though it represented the fruit of a complex process of 
negotiation between the constituent provinces with the occasional paternal push 
from the Colonial Office, which favoured Confederation but was unwilling to 
impose it,27 its application to the validity of Canadian legislation was for many 
decades treated “by the same methods of construction and exposition which 
25. Sprouts of such a scholarly movement in Canada have already begun to germinate. For 
an early exponent of new originalism in Canada, see Adam M Dodek, “The Dutiful 
Conscript: An Originalist View of Justice Wilson’s Conception of Charter Rights and Their 
Limits” (2008) 41 Sup Ct L Rev (2d) 331. For more recent contributions, see Benjamin 
Oliphant & Léonid Sirota, “Has the Supreme Court of Canada Rejected ‘Originalism’?” 
(17 March 2016), online: Social Science Research Network, online: <http://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2749212>; Kerri Froc, The Untapped Power of Section 
28 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (PhD Thesis, Queen’s University, 
2015) [unpublished], online: <https://qspace.library.queensu.ca/bitstream/1974/13905/1/
Froc_Kerri_A_201512_PhD.pdf>.
26. This is the “counter-majoritarian difficulty.” For its first naming, see Alexander M Bickel, 
The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics, 2d ed (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1986) at 16.
27. PB Waite, The Life and Times of Confederation, 1864–1867: Politics, Newspapers, and the 
Union of British North America, 3d ed (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1962) at 
104-05 [Waite, Confederation, 3d ed].
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[courts] apply to other statutes.”28 A guide to how the legal culture at the time of 
Confederation viewed the activities of statutory construction and exposition is 
the first edition of Maxwell’s On the Interpretation of Statutes, which appeared in 
1875.29 Its opening words set out a deceptively straightforward mission for the 
judicial interpreter:
Statute law is the will of the Legislature; and the object of all judicial interpretation 
of it is to determine what intention is conveyed, either expressly or by implication, 
by the language used, so far as it is necessary for determining whether the particular 
case or state of facts presented to the interpreter falls within it.30
At first glance, the “will of the Legislature” appears to be a historical fact 
of what the members of that legislature intended to do. On the most naïve 
approach, judges should decide cases just as those who voted for the law would 
have, and should use whatever evidence they can get about what that decision 
would have been.31 But Maxwell rejected that inference. Maxwell approved of 
Lord Westbury’s statement that he would, in his judicial role of interpreting 
the Bankruptcy Act, divest himself of any knowledge he had as the Attorney 
General who had introduced it in the Commons.32 What mattered was not the 
psychological intention of the legislators, but the intention “conveyed … by the 
language used.” The question for the judge was “not what the Legislature meant, 
but what its language means.”33 It did not—and could not—matter what the 
drafters of the statute thought it would in fact accomplish; what mattered was 
what the legislature willed to say, not what it willed to do.34
But Maxwell did not reject history altogether as a guide for interpretation. 
Since “[l]anguage is rarely so free from ambiguity as to be incapable of being 
used in more than one sense,”35 history should be considered so as to put the 
judicial interpreter in the position of those whose words are being interpreted.36 
28. Bank of Toronto v Lambe (1887), 12 AC 575 (PC) [Lambe] at 579.
29. Peter Benson Maxwell, On the Interpretation of Statutes (London: William 
Maxwell & Son, 1875).
30. Peter Benson Maxwell, On the Interpretation of Statutes, 2d ed (London: W Maxwell & Son, 
1883) at 1, online: <https://ia902609.us.archive.org/23/items/oninterpretatio01maxwgoog/
oninterpretatio01maxwgoog.pdf> [Maxwell, Interpretation, 2d].
31. In Balkin’s phrase, this approach is “expected application” originalism. Balkin, Living 
Originalism, supra note 14 at 7 (“Original expected application asks how people living at the 
time the text was adopted would have expected it would be applied”).
32. Maxwell, Interpretation, 2d, supra note 30 at 33, citing Re Mew, 31 LJ Bcy 89.
33. Maxwell, Interpretation, 2d, supra note 30 at 7.
34. Ibid at 32.
35. Ibid at 25.
36. Ibid at 28.
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With older statutes, which might have been subject to general linguistic change, 
historical evidence of usage (contemporanea exposito) was relevant. While it did 
not matter what the parliamentarians intended, it did matter what their words 
meant at the time.37
The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council did not refer to legislative 
history to interpret the BNA Act, but it occasionally referred to the “common 
understanding” that prevailed at the time it was passed.38 For example, in deciding 
what “direct taxation” in section 92(2) meant, the Judicial Committee considered 
what the distinction meant in the political economy generally accepted in 1867.39 
Since the distinction was a technical one, the relevant linguistic community was 
political economists, and thus the Privy Council accepted John Stuart Mill’s 1848 
definition of “direct tax.”40 Interestingly, the Judicial Committee distanced itself 
from the scientific validity of the distinction between a direct and indirect tax: 
The “marginal revolution” in economics was making the distinction untenable, 
and the Judicial Committee seemed to have an inkling of the change but ignored 
it. What mattered was what the words meant at the time.41
Lord Sankey’s decision in Edwards introduced the metaphor of the “living 
tree” into Canadian jurisprudence.42 The Judicial Committee overruled the 
decision of the SCC that women could not be “qualified persons” to be summoned 
by the Governor General to the Senate under section 24 of the BNA Act because 
of the political disabilities of women that existed in 1867.43 As Bradley Miller 
has argued, a careful reading of the Judicial Committee’s decision shows that it 
37. Clyde Navigation v Laird (1883), 8 AC 658 (HL) at 673, Lord Watson (“When there are 
ambiguous expressions in an Act passed one or two centuries ago, it may be legitimate to 
refer to the construction put upon these expressions throughout a long course of years, by the 
unanimous consent of all parties interested, as evidencing what must presumably have been 
the intention of the legislature at that remote period”).
38. Lambe, supra note 28 at 582.
39. AG Quebec v Reed (1884), 10 AC 141 (PC) at 143 (“[T]hose words [‘direct taxation’] must 
be understood with some reference to the common understanding of them which prevailed 
among those who had treated more or less scientifically such subjects before the [BNA 
Act] was passed”).
40. Ibid, citing John Stuart Mill, Principles of Political Economy with some of their Applications 
to Social Philosophy, 7th ed (London: Longmans, Green & Co, 1909), bk 5, ch 3 (“A 
direct tax is one which is demanded from the very persons who, it is intended or desired, 
should pay it”).
41. For a later example, see Reference whether “Indians” includes “Eskimo”, [1939] SCR 104 
(considering evidence of usage of term “Indian” in pre-Confederation colonial discourse).
42. Edwards, supra note 17 at 136, Sankey LC.
43. Constitution Act, 1867, supra note 1, s 24.
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is consistent with Maxwell’s approach to statutory interpretation: History is to 
be consulted for the meaning of words but not for the intentions of legislators.44
Constitutional consensus in Canada broke down in the 1930s when the 
federal government proved unable to take interventionist measures to combat the 
Depression as a result of the provincialist decisions of the Judicial Committee.45 
In contrast, during the same decade in the United States, progressive and realist 
critics of traditional federalism triumphed in the New Deal-era Supreme Court.46 
Canadian legal academics who identified with this social movement to limit 
laissez-faire capitalism and who believed only federal authority could effectively 
do so—W.P.M. Kennedy, Vincent MacDonald, and Frank Scott—turned 
to the historical record at the time of Confederation to critique the judicial 
interpretation of the Canadian Constitution.47 They contrasted the strong desire 
for a centralized federal union, expressed by Fathers of Confederation like Sir 
John A. Macdonald and George Brown, with what the Judicial Committee had 
44. Bradley W Miller, “Origin Myth: The Persons Case, the Living Tree, and the New 
Originalism” in Grant Huscroft & Bradley W Miller, eds, The Challenge of Originalism: 
Theories of Constitutional Interpretation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011) 120.
45. WH McConnell, “The Judicial Review of Prime Minister Bennett’s ‘New Deal’” (1968) 6:1 
Osgoode Hall LJ 39.
46. In 1913, Oliver Wendell Holmes said, “I do not think the United States would come to an 
end if we [the Supreme Court] lost our power to declare an Act of Congress void. I do think 
the Union would be imperiled if we could not make that declaration as to the laws of the 
several states.” See Richard A Posner, ed, The Essential Holmes: Selections from the Letters, 
Speeches, Judicial Opinions, and Other Writings of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1992) at 147. In the New Deal Revolution, a majority of the 
US Supreme Court moved away from striking down federal legislation on the grounds it 
went beyond Congress’ enumerated powers. See NLRB v Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp, 301 
US 1 at 38-39 (1937) [Jones] (upholding comprehensive federal labour legislation); Wickard 
v Filburn, 317 US 111 at 124 (1942) (upholding federal regulation of the production of 
feed crops for personal use based on the potential impact on interstate commerce). The 
legal realist/legal process school consensus against judicial review on federalism grounds was 
crystallized in Herbert Wechsler, “The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the 
States in Composition and Selection of the National Government” (1954) 54:4 Colum L 
Rev 543. After Jones, no US federal law was struck down for exceeding Congressional powers 
in Article 1 until United States v Lopez, 514 US 549 (1995).
47. RCB Risk, A History of Canadian Legal Thought: Collected Essays, by G Blaine Baker & Jim 
Phillips (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2006) at 242-49; Vincent C MacDonald, 
“Judicial Interpretation of the Canadian Constitution” (1936) 1:2 UTLJ 260; “The 
Privy Council and Mr. Bennett’s ‘New Deal’ Legislation” in Frank R Scott, Essays on 
the Constitution: Aspects of Canadian Law and Politics (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 1977) 90.
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wrought.48 During the postwar period, other critics emphasized the degree to 
which the Confederation pact was a compromise between the centralist views 
of the politicians of Canada West and the concern for provincial autonomy 
of George-Étienne Cartier and many of the participants from the maritime 
colonies.49 The recognition that both centralist and decentralist agendas went 
back all the way to the founding moment complicated a search for the intent of 
the Fathers of Confederation. But the common ground was that constitutional 
interpretation could not avoid a historical investigation of the political bargain 
underlying the text.
Future SCC Justices Bora Laskin and Louis-Philippe Pigeon played major 
roles in the academic debate of the postwar, pre-Charter period,50 but there were 
few references to history on the face of constitutional jurisprudence, even after 
appeals to the Judicial Committee were abolished. This looked like it might 
change in the 1970s. In Jones v Attorney General of New Brunswick et al,51 the Court 
briefly reviewed the history of legislative bilingualism in the pre-Confederation 
Province of Canada, and the content of the resolutions at the pre-Confederation 
Quebec and London conferences, when deciding that section 133 of the BNA Act 
was not intended to limit supplementary bilingualism legislation.52 In the Upper 
House Reference, the Court referred for the first time to the parliamentary debates 
preceding Confederation to come to the conclusion that the Senate was designed 
to provide regional representation in the central Parliament.53 Shortly afterward, 
48. A number of historians of this and of the next generation also supported this centralist 
interpretation of Confederation. See e.g. Donald Creighton, The Road to Confederation: The 
Emergence of Canada, 1863–1867, revised ed (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2012); 
Waite, Confederation, 3d ed, supra note 27; John T Saywell, The Lawmakers: Judicial Power 
and the Shaping of Canadian Federalism (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2002).
49. For a full discussion of this intellectual history, see Peter W Hogg & Wade K Wright, 
“Canadian Federalism, the Privy Council and the Supreme Court: Reflections on the 
Debate about Canadian Federalism” (2005) 38:2 UBC L Rev 329. For the rise and fall (and 
perhaps subsequent rise) of the “compact theory” in Canadian jurisprudence, see Sébastien 
Grammond, “Compact is Back: The Supreme Court of Canada’s Revival of the Compact 
Theory of Confederation” (2016) 53:3 Osgoode Hall LJ [page 799].
50. See e.g. Bora Laskin, “‘Peace, Order and Good Government’ Re-Examined” (1947) 25 Can 
Bar Rev 1054; Louis-Phillipe Pigeon, “The Meaning of Provincial Autonomy” (1951) 29 
Can Bar Rev 1126.
51. [1975] 2 SCR 182, 1974 CanLii 164 [Jones cited to SCR].
52. Ibid at 194-95.
53. Re: Authority of Parliament in Relation to the Upper House, [1980] 1 SCR 54 at 66-67 [Upper 
House Reference].
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the SCC gradually abandoned any restriction on referring to parliamentary 
debates as a guide to ordinary legislative interpretation.54
But this was a false dawn—at least with respect to giving the history of 
the adoption of the constitutional text an important role in constitutional 
interpretation. In 1983, Chief Justice Laskin discounted the helpfulness of referring 
to the Confederation debates in reference to division of powers issues, stating, 
“There are, at best, general observations in the Confederation Debates respecting 
criminal law and procedure.”55 More significantly, when it came to interpreting 
the Charter, the SCC was highly skeptical of a historical-political analysis.
There were at least two reasons for this skepticism, both of which require 
consideration of the American context. The first was political-ideological. Under 
Earl Warren and for a few years after he left as Chief Justice, the US Supreme 
Court had engaged in a strikingly liberal and progressive constitutionalism. 
Early 1970s-era originalism—as championed by legal theorists like Raoul Berger 
and Robert Bork, and politicians like Edwin Meese and Ronald Reagan—was a 
conservative response to what that court had done. These critics argued that the 
progressive decisions of the era—ranging from school desegregation,56 electoral 
reapportionment,57 and a due process revolution in criminal procedure,58 to 
the striking down of abortion laws59 and capital punishment60—went beyond 
anything men like James Madison or Alexander Hamilton could possibly have had 
in mind when drafting the constitutional text. Since, as a matter of indisputable 
historical fact, these framers had no problem with school segregation, unequal 
electoral districts, police questioning without the benefit of Miranda warnings, 
54. See e.g. R v Vasil, [1981] 1 SCR 469 at 487, [1981] SCJ No 43; R v Lyons, [1984] 2 
SCR 633 at 683-84, [1984] SCJ No 63. Parliamentary history is now routinely used for 
interpretative purposes. See Stéphane Beaulac, “Recent Developments at the Supreme Court 
of Canada on the Use of Parliamentary Debates” (2000) 63:2 Sask L Rev 581; John James 
Magyar, “The Evolution of Hansard Use at the Supreme Court of Canada: A Comparative 
Study in Statutory Interpretation” (2012) 33:3 Statute L Rev 363 at 364.
55. Attorney General (Canada) v Canadian National Transportation, Ltd, [1983] 2 SCR 206 at 
225-26, [1983] SCJ No 73. Justice Dickson, in dissent, relied on the practice of provincial 
prosecution of crimes at the time of Confederation. See ibid at 279.
56. Brown v Board of Education of Topeka, 347 US 483 (1954) [Brown].
57. Baker v Carr, 369 US 186 (1962); Gray v Sanders, 372 US 368 (1963); Reynolds v Sims, 
377 US 533 (1964).
58. Griffin v Illinois, 351 US 12 (1956); Lambert v California, 355 US 225 (1957); Sherman v 
United States, 356 US 369 (1958); Mapp v Ohio, 367 US 643 (1961); Gideon v Wainwright, 
372 US 335 (1963); Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436 (1966).
59. Roe v Wade, 410 US 113 (1973) [Roe].
60. Furman v Georgia, 408 US 238 (1972) [Furman]. The change in the ideological tide was 
made clear by the effective reversal of Furman in Gregg v Georgia, 428 US 153 (1976).
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and bans on abortion or the noose, the Warren court was obviously acting 
illegitimately, if the intent of the framers was what mattered.
The Canadian advocates of the Charter were, however, clearly inspired by 
the Warren court, whose record contrasted so starkly with that of the SCC in 
interpreting the Canadian Bill of Rights.61 Thus, the idea of original intent could 
not have recommended itself to those who wanted to demonstrate that the Charter, 
unlike its predecessor, would have a significant impact on Canadian law. At the 
same time, original intent could not have been particularly appealing to Charter 
skeptics or social conservatives either, since the framers were contemporary liberal 
(and Liberal) politicians and bureaucrats. Argument from this quarter tended to 
emphasize democratic principles and institutional problems with the judiciary, 
not original intent.62
Moreover, originalism63 appeared to most legal commentators to be easily 
discredited. Berger and Bork advocated an “expected application”64 version of 
originalism: The issue was how the framers would have decided the case if it had 
61. SC 1960, c 44 [Bill of Rights]. For the only pre-Charter case in which a statute was declared 
inoperative as a result of inconsistency with the Bill of Rights, see R v Drybones, [1970] SCR 
282 (finding that an offence confined to “Indians” was contrary to equality under the law). 
For more representative cases, see Robertson and Rosetanni v The Queen, [1963] SCR 651 
(upholding the Lord’s Day Act); The Queen v Appleby, [1972] SCR 303 (upholding “reverse 
onus” provisions); Attorney General of Canada v Lavell—Isaac v Bédard, [1974] SCR 1349 
(upholding facial sex discrimination in the Indian Act); Miller et al v The Queen, [1977] 2 
SCR 680 (upholding the death penalty). For a contemporary account of how the Charter was 
structured to address perceived problems with the Bill of Rights, see Walter S Tarnopolsky, 
“The Constitution and Human Rights” in Keith Banting & Richard Simeon, eds, And No 
One Cheered: Federalism, Democracy & the Constitution Act (Toronto: Methuen, 1983) 261.
62. To be sure, critics of judicial review on both the political left and right uniformly 
criticized the expansive reading of section 7 in the Motor Vehicle Act Reference, infra note 
73, as exceeding original intent. See e.g. Michael Mandel, The Charter of Rights and the 
Legalization of Politics in Canada (Toronto: Thompson Educational, 1989) at 152-53; Rainer 
Knopff & FL Morton, Charter Politics (Scarborough, Ont: Nelson Canada, 1992) at 130-31. 
But this was a relatively minor note in a critique that was primarily about how judicial review 
interferes with contemporary majority rule.
63. Like many ideological terms, “originalism” appears to have been coined by its opponents 
and only later adopted by its advocates. See Paul Brest, “The Misconceived Quest for the 
Original Understanding” (1980) 60:2 BUL Rev 204 at 204. Brest writes: “By ‘originalism’ I 
mean the familiar approach to constitutional adjudication that accords binding authority to 
the text of the Constitution or the intentions of its adopters.” See also Lawrence B Solum, 
“What is Originalism? The Evolution of Contemporary Originalist Theory” [Solum, “What 
is Originalism?”] in Huscroft & Miller, eds, supra note 44, 12 at 13 (stating that Brest coined 
the term “originalism”).
64. “Expected application,” as a term, is a bit of an anachronism in this context, since it was 
developed in Balkin, Living Originalism, supra note 14 at 7.
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come before them. In an influential attack, Paul Brest demonstrated a number of 
problems with originalism understood in this way65:
1. The social-change objection. Technological and social change 
implies that many contemporary controversies simply could not 
have been anticipated by the authors of a constitution drafted 
long ago: Since airplanes were invented in the twentieth century, 
neither the US Constitution66 nor Canada’s Constitution Act, 186767 
could have contemplated whether the federal government should 
have jurisdiction over aeronautics, but a court can hardly avoid the 
issue. More profoundly, mass social movements, such as the labour 
movement or feminism, have deeply changed the social context in 
which a constitution exists.
2. The dead-hand-of-the-past objection. The intentions of the framers 
have no democratic legitimacy for future generations, especially 
given the racial and gender exclusions of 1789 and 1867. Unlike 
the social change argument, this applies whether or not the issue 
is one the originators of a constitution would have foreseen: Even 
if they did foresee it, what right do they have to dictate to future 
generations? In the Canadian context, why should feminists of the 
1920s be bound by how Victorians thought of female personhood? 
Why should marginalized Canadians looking for help from the 
Charter care about what ten bourgeois white men thought in 1982?
3. The no-corporate-intention objection. The framers themselves might 
fundamentally disagree about how the constitution should be 
applied: The generation that agreed to the American Bill of Rights 
fundamentally disagreed about whether the Alien and Sedition Acts—
enacted by John Adams’ Federalists and vehemently opposed by 
Jefferson and Madison’s Democratic Republicans—were consistent 
with it. Canadians repeated this experience in the generation after 
1982, as fundamental disagreements arose among the authors of the 
Charter (to the extent it was possible to identify such individuals) 
as to how constitutional cases should be resolved. If intentions are 
65. The names of the four objections that follow are mine, but the first three are intended to 
summarize Brest’s argument, while the point that originalism was not the original method 
was first advanced in H Jefferson Powell, “The Original Understanding of Original Intent” 
(1985) 98:5 Harv L Rev 885.
66. Supra note 1. Article I, section 8 authorizes Congress to “raise and support armies” and to 
“provide and maintain a navy,” but of course does not refer to an air force.
67. Re Regulations and Control of Aeronautics in Canada, [1932] AC 54, [1932] 1 DLR 38 (PC).
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discrete mental events, they require a single mind in which they can 
occur. Constitutions are not authored by a single mind.
4. The originalism-was-not-the-original-method objection. At least in 
the common law world, the framers themselves did not believe 
that the psychological states of mind of those enacting legal texts 
should be binding—as evidenced in the Anglo-Canadian context 
by the inadmissibility of parliamentary history as a guide to 
interpretation.68 As a result, critics of originalism could make the 
devastating point that the original intent was not necessarily to follow 
original intent.
In its first Charter case, the Court embraced the “living tree” metaphor,69 
emphasized that the difficulty of amending a constitution left the “fine and 
constant adjustment” of constitutional provisions to the judiciary,70 and 
disregarded evidence of political statements by federal or provincial politicians on 
the interpretation of mobility rights.71 In the first case to strike down a statutory 
provision, the Court echoed some of Brest’s points, particularly the social-change 
and dead-hand-of-the past objections:
The task of expounding a constitution is crucially different from that of construing 
a statute. A statute defines present rights and obligations. It is easily enacted and 
as easily repealed. A constitution, by contrast, is drafted with an eye to the future. 
Its function is to provide a continuing framework for the legitimate exercise of 
governmental power and, when joined by a Bill or a Charter of Rights, for the 
unremitting protection of individual rights and liberties. Once enacted, its provisions 
cannot easily be repealed or amended. It must, therefore, be capable of growth and 
development over time to meet new social, political and historical realities often 
unimagined by its framers.72
The most dramatic early consequence of this approach was the decision 
of the Court to include substantive, not merely procedural, principles of 
68. See e.g., Gosselin v The King (1903), 33 SCR 255 at 264; Attorney General of Canada v 
Reader’s Digest Association (Canada) Ltd, [1961] SCR 775 at 793.
69. Law Society of Upper Canada v Skapinker, [1984] 1 SCR 357 at 365, [1984] SCJ No 18.
70. Ibid at 366.
71. Ibid at 381-82.
72. Hunter, supra note 4 at 155.
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fundamental justice within the guarantee of section 7 of the Charter.73 Before 
the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons on the 
Constitution of Canada, the two public servants most responsible for the federal 
proposed constitutional package, Barry Strayer (Assistant Deputy Minister for 
Public Law at the Department of Justice) and Roger Tassé (Deputy Minister), 
relying on jurisprudence under the Diefenbaker Bill of Rights,74 stated that 
“principles of fundamental justice” were limited to procedural fairness or natural 
justice, and did not allow for the review of the substantive content of legislation.75 
Lower courts relied on these comments to conclude that section 7 entrenched 
procedural, but not substantive, justice.76 The SCC disagreed, invoking the 
no-corporate-intention,77 social-change78 and dead-hand-of-the-past objections.79 
While the statements of the political actors were admissible,80 Justice Lamer for a 
unanimous Court considered that they were “unreliab[le]” because statements of 
73. Re BC Motor Vehicle Act, [1985] 2 SCR 486, [1985] SCJ No 73 [Motor Vehicle Act Reference 
cited to SCR]. This decision was the jurisprudential foundation of some of the most 
far-reaching SCC decisions, including R v Morgentaler, [1988] 1 SCR 30, [1988] SCJ No 1 
(striking down the prohibition of abortion); Chaoulli v Quebec (Attorney General), 2005 SCC 
35, [2005] 1 SCR 791 (striking down Quebec’s prohibition on private health insurance); 
Canada (Attorney General) v Bedford, 2013 SCC 72, [2013] 3 SCR 1101 (striking down 
legislation regulating sex work) [Bedford]; Carter v Canada (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 5, 
[2015] 1 SCR 331 (striking down the prohibition of assisted suicide).
74. See e.g. Duke v The Queen, [1972] SCR 917.
75. Barry L Strayer, Canada’s Constitutional Revolution (Edmonton: University of Alberta Press, 
2013) at 258-59.
76. See e.g. Latham v Solicitor General of Canada, [1984] 2 FC 734, 39 CR (3d) 78; Re Mason 
and The Queen, [1983] OJ No 3174, 1 DLR (4th) 712 (Ont HC); R v Holman, [1982] BCJ 
No 962, 28 CR (3d) 378 (BC Prov Ct).
77. Motor Vehicle Act Reference, supra note 73 at 507, citing Joseph Eliot Magnet, “The 
Presumption of Constitutionality” (1980) 18:1 Osgoode Hall LJ 87 at 99 (“In the 
constitutional cases, the issue of intent concerns the legislature, an incorporeal body made up 
of hundreds of persons. It may be said that such a body, like a corporation, is a legal fiction 
and has no intention in the relevant sense. It would follow that legislative intent, in the 
constitutional setting, is a hollow concept”).
78. Motor Vehicle Act Reference, supra note 73 at 509 (“Another danger with casting the 
interpretation of s. 7 in terms of the comments made by those heard at the Special Joint 
Committee Proceedings is that, in so doing, the rights, freedoms and values embodied in 
the Charter in effect become frozen in time to the moment of adoption with little or no 
possibility of growth, development and adjustment to changing societal needs”).
79. Ibid (“If the newly planted ‘living tree’ which is the Charter is to have the possibility of 
growth and adjustment over time, care must be taken to ensure that historical materials, 
such as the Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Special Joint Committee, do not 
stunt its growth”).
80. Ibid at 505-07.
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individuals cannot determine the intent of the “multiplicity of individuals who 
played major roles in the negotiating, drafting and adoption of the Charter.”81 
Indeed, he said the “intention of the legislative bodies which adopted the Charter” 
is a matter “nearly impossible of proof.”82
It is interesting to note that there was nothing particularly Canadian about 
the arguments Justice Lamer deployed; indeed, they essentially recapitulated the 
points made by Brest. But there is no doubt Justice Lamer’s statements in the Motor 
Vehicle Act Reference have become conventional wisdom, at least among those 
who generally support the practice of constitutional judicial review in Canada.83
II. THE NEW ORIGINALISM IN THE UNITED STATES
The election of President Ronald Reagan brought the original intent school to 
a position of political power, but Brest’s criticisms were difficult to answer. The 
failure of Robert Bork’s nomination to the US Supreme Court in 1987 suggested 
that consistent originalism was also politically toxic in the United States. But, 
at least at the academic level, American originalism evolved, and responded to the 
objections. One development was to temper originalist fervour with a pragmatic 
acknowledgment that some non-originalist precedents must stand because 
societal reliance on them has grown too great. In Scalia’s words, “[A]lmost every 
originalist would adulterate it with the doctrine of stare decisis—so that Marbury 
v. Madison would stand even if Professor Raoul Berger should demonstrate 
unassailably that it got the meaning of the Constitution wrong.”84 Even 
Richard Epstein—a proponent of reversing most post-1937 US constitutional 
jurisprudence—has argued that since any actual polity will evolve in ways that 
are in practice irreversible, just as property law must accept that trespasses carried 
on long enough create prescriptive easements, there is inevitably both an original 
and “prescriptive” constitution.85 A Canadian example of a textual provision that 
81. Ibid at 508.
82. Ibid at 508-09. It is not clear what Justice Lamer’s reference to “legislative bodies” refers to. 
While the new Constitution derived from a joint resolution of the Senate and House of 
Commons, it was fictionally a Schedule to an Act of the Parliament of the United Kingdom 
and really the product of executive deal making. But this strengthens the point. If the issue 
was an ‘intention’ as a mental act, then in the context of the Constitution Act, 1982, it was 
not even determinate whose mental act that might be.
83. Binnie, supra note 15; Hogg, Constitutional Law, 5th, supra note 16, c 60.1(e).
84. Antonin Scalia, “Originalism: The Lesser Evil” (1989) 57:3 U Cin L Rev 849 at 861.
85. Richard A Epstein, The Classical Liberal Constitution: The Uncertain Quest for Limited 
Government (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2014) ch 3.
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is unlikely ever to be revived because of a combination of disuse and reliance on 
that disuse would be section 56 of the Constitution Act, 1867, which requires 
federal statutes to be sent to a British cabinet minister and permits the British 
cabinet to disallow the statute.86
Acknowledging that stare decisis must sometimes override original intent was 
simply adding water to originalist wine. The next step was to change originalism’s 
flavour, rather than just dilute it. The second generation of originalists decided 
that what mattered at the origin point was not intent—focusing on what could 
be imputed to the mentality of the drafters—but understanding—focusing on 
the way that the language would be understood broadly within the linguistic 
community at the time of adoption.87 The terms “meaning” and “intention” 
both contain ambiguity between their semantic and pragmatic senses. Semantic 
meaning or intention refers to what the speaker meant or intended to say, 
whereas pragmatic meaning or intention refers to what the speaker meant or 
intended to accomplish. In an exchange with Antonin Scalia, a Reagan-appointee 
to the US Supreme Court and self-proclaimed originalist, Ronald Dworkin gave 
the example of a boss who instructs a subordinate to hire “the most qualified 
candidate,” assuming it will be the boss’s son.88 If the subordinate thought another 
candidate was better qualified, he or she would be following the pragmatic 
meaning (and perhaps avoiding unemployment) by hiring the son, but would 
violate the semantic meaning of the command. Both Dworkin and Scalia89 agreed 
that it was the semantic intention that judges should pay attention to, and that 
semantic intention did not depend on internal mental acts, but on the common 
understanding of the relevant linguistic community of what proposition words 
uttered in that context would state. Whatever “original meaning” might be, 
it should not be located psychologically in the heads of the framers, but socially 
in the relevant linguistic community at the time the text was adopted.
This development responded to the no-corporate-intention objection: 
If meaning is not psychological, it no longer matters that corporate bodies 
do not have psychological intentions. It also responded to the objection that 
originalism did not reflect historic methods of interpretation. As I explained 
86. Andrew Heard, Canadian Constitutional Conventions: The Marriage of Law and Politics 
(Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1991) at 5.
87. Solum, “What is Originalism?” supra note 63 at 22-24.
88. Ronald Dworkin, “Comment” in Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation, supra note 
10, 115 at 116-17.
89. Antonin Scalia, “Response” in ibid, 129 at 144. Scalia writes: “I agree with the distinction 
that Professor Dworkin draws … between what he calls ‘semantic intention’ and the concrete 
expectations of lawgivers. It is indeed the former rather than the latter that I follow.”
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in Part I, above, Maxwell showed that the common law tradition of statutory 
interpretation refused to consider evidence of the psychology of the enactors 
of legislation, which is why it did not use legislative history. But it was open 
to evidence of linguistic change, as with the doctrine of contemporanea exposito, 
because it considered changes in the meaning given by the relevant linguistic 
community to be important. Although there were some old-time originalists who 
resisted the externalization of original meaning,90 it had a powerful ally in Scalia, 
who was just as committed to eliminating reliance on legislative history in the 
interpretation of statutes as he was to constitutional originalism.
The next move was to distinguish between the semantic meaning of a 
more-or-less vague legal norm91 and its application to a concrete legal dispute.92 
Here the “new originalists” developed a new vocabulary. Lawyers typically 
use the term “interpretation” to mean both the activity of determining what 
words in a legal text mean in the abstract sense and how that abstract meaning 
applies to a particular case or controversy.93 New originalists distinguished these 
two activities, referring only to the former as “interpretation” and the latter as 
“construction.”94 This enabled them to accept—indeed, insist—that the courts 
play a creative role when applying vague constitutional commandments, and 
that they are not bound to do so as the founding generation would have. The 
founding generation governs whether a text encodes a rule, standard, or principle 
and, if so, what rule, standard, or principle. But the work of determining what 
might be the implications of a standard or principle for the validity of a law 
depends on social facts and normative values that must be left to succeeding 
generations to determine themselves.
The new originalist distinction between interpretation and construction 
mirrors the distinction made in the philosophy of language, since the time of 
90. Larry Alexander, “Simple-Minded Originalism” in Huscroft & Miller, eds, supra note 44, 87.
91. Solum calls this the “communicative content.” See Lawrence B Solum, “Communicative 
Content and Legal Content” (2013) 89:2 Notre Dame L Rev 479.
92. Solum calls this the “legal content.” See ibid.
93. For Maxwell’s definition, see Maxwell, Interpretation, 2d, supra note 30 at 1. He writes: “[T]
he object of all judicial interpretation … is to determine [a] what intention is conveyed, 
either expressly or by implication, by the language used, so far as it is necessary for 
determining [b] whether the particular case or state of facts presented to the interpreter 
falls within it.”
94. Keith E Whittington, Constitutional Construction: Divided Powers and Constitutional Meaning 
(Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1999); Keith E Whittingon, Constitutional 
Interpretation: Textual Meaning, Original Intent, and Judicial Review (Lawrence, Kans: 
University Press of Kansas, 1999); Randy E Barnett, “An Originalism for Nonoriginalists” 
(1999) 45:4 Loy L Rev 611.
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Gottlob Frege, between the sense of a linguistic unit and its reference,95 or, in most 
recent iterations, between its intension and its extension.96 I will use the latter 
terminology here. The extension is easier to understand: It is the set of all objects 
in the world that are in fact described by the unit. A has the same extension as B 
if it is the case that x is a member of the set of entities described by A if and only if 
x is a member of the set of entities described by B. For example, the extension of 
“Bora Laskin” and “the Chief Justice of Canada in 1980” consist of one entity—
the now-deceased individual human being to whom both descriptions apply.
Intension is a more difficult concept: It is an object of a propositional 
attitude (like belief or desire). A encodes the same intension as B if it is the case 
that P believes (or desires, etc.) something about A if and only if P believes the 
same thing about B. I may not be familiar with who was the Chief Justice of 
Canada in 1980. But I may know that the Chief Justice gives royal assent to 
federal bills when the Governor General is unavailable. I would therefore believe 
that, in 1980, the Chief Justice of Canada gave royal assent to federal bills when 
the Governor General was unavailable, but I would not believe that Bora Laskin 
did so. Therefore, the intension of “Bora Laskin” and “Chief Justice of Canada in 
1980” are not the same.
If a word or phrase is ambiguous, then there are a discrete number of 
possible intensions, and context has to make it clear which one is meant.97 A trite 
example is “bank,” which can refer either to the side of a river or to a financial 
institution that accepts deposits. The word “bank” is ambiguous between these 
two intensions. But if a word or phrase is vague, then it has a single intension 
with a fuzzy or debatable extension. The hackneyed example of a vague predicate 
is “bald”: While Patrick Stewart clearly is bald, reasonable people might disagree 
about William Shatner.98
A disagreement about the application of a textual command to a particular 
situation can turn either on ambiguity or vagueness. Suppose a teacher instructs 
95. Gottlob Frege “On Sense and Reference” in Peter Geach & Max Black, eds, Translations from 
the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege, 2d ed (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1960) 56.
96. David J Chalmers, “On Sense and Intension” (2002) 36:S16 (supp) Noûs 135. “Intension” 
should not be confused with “intention.” In making a statement, the utterer may have 
intentions both with respect to the sense/intension of her utterance and its reference/
extension. The distinction is developed in the text.
97. Ralf Poscher, “Ambiguity and Vagueness in Legal Interpretation” in Peter M Tiersma & 
Lawrence M Solan, eds, Oxford Handbook on Language and Law (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2012) 128.
98. “The Many Hairlines of William Shatner” Bald Celebrity (10 June 2011), online: <http://
www.baldcelebrity.com/the-many-hairlines-of-william-shatner>.
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two students to “choose the lightest feather.” The first child might think they 
should pick the feather with the least mass, while the second child thinks they 
should pick the palest feather. In that case, they have a disagreement about how 
to resolve ambiguity—an interpretative disagreement, in the narrower sense of 
interpretation favoured by new originalists.99 But if both children think they 
should pick the palest feather, but are unable to agree about which one that 
is, then they have a disagreement about how to resolve vagueness—for new 
originalists, a disagreement of construction. The second type of disagreement is 
not really a disagreement about the meaning of the teacher’s words, but about 
the hue of two feathers. While the accurate resolution of the disagreement of 
interpretation turns on psychological or linguistic facts about the teacher, the 
disagreement of construction can only be resolved by looking at external facts 
about the world. These need not be simply empirical facts. If the teacher told 
the students to “share your toys fairly,” it is easy to imagine the students having 
a disagreement about how to apply this command. But the disagreement is 
not really about the meaning of language or the psychological intentions of the 
teacher. It is about what division of toys is fair. In this case, construction requires 
the children to look at normative or moral facts.
In the drafting of legal texts, ambiguity is usually unintentional (and often 
easy to disambiguate with context), while vagueness may be strategic. A vague 
term may have been decided upon precisely because the parties do not agree about, 
or cannot foresee, the cases to which it will be applied.100 When a party agrees to 
a vague term, the party is consenting to giving the interpreter or applier a degree 
of discretion, either because the party thinks the interpreter or applier will be 
better placed to make the decision or as the price of the deal. This phenomenon 
is familiar for all kinds of legal texts, including commercial or labour contracts. 
In the context of broad constitutional provisions, it can normally be inferred that 
this discretion will be governed by social facts and prudential and moral beliefs of 
the body empowered to apply the provision.
Dworkin divided legal norms into three categories: rules, such as a speed 
limit, which can be applied to a set of facts by simple deductive reasoning 
without reference to their underlying purpose; standards, such as the reasonable 
person standard in negligence, which calls for an act of normative judgment; 
and principles, such as freedom of speech, which must be balanced against other 
99. Lawrence B Solum, “The Interpretation-Construction Distinction” (2010) 27:1 
Const Commentary 95.
100. Timothy Endicott, “The Value of Vagueness” in Andrei Marmor & Scott Soames, eds, 
Philosophical Foundations of Language in the Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) 14.
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principles to derive a legal answer.101 Using this typology of legal norms, the 
intension of a legal text is the type of norm (e.g., the rule, standard, or principle) 
that the text of the contract, statute, or constitution encodes, while the extension 
is the set of actual cases in which the provision mattered to the result. By their 
nature, standards and principles are vaguer than rules. If the text encodes, 
as a matter of interpretation, a standard or principle, then it invites prudential 
and moral disagreement when applied. If Robert Alexy is correct that “the nature 
of principles implies the principle of proportionality,”102 then constitutional 
provisions that encode principles necessarily invite proportionality analysis as 
part of construction, with all that that entails.103
While there are subtle differences among theorists, the new originalist 
contribution is that it is the intension that is fixed at the time of enactment 
and remains unchanged until the legal text is properly amended.104 The new 
originalist, like the old originalist, sees the fixing of this intension as a historical 
event. Historical facts going to this meaning are therefore the authoritative 
source for arguments about the intension of the constitutional provision. This 
view should be distinguished from the use of pre- and post-adoption history by 
common law constitutionalists to provide insight about a dynamic tradition of 
meaning unfolding before and after adoption.105 So far as the intension of the text 
goes, pre- and post-adoption historical facts are relevant only to the extent they 
101. These distinctions were first set out in Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge, 
Mass: Harvard University Press, 1977), chs 2-3. This particular typology has been criticized 
for mixing up the issue of defeasibility with the issue of the extent to which a judgment call 
is left with the interpreter/applier. See Larry Alexander, “Legal Objectivity and the Illusion 
of Legal Principles” in Matthias Klatt, ed, Institutionalized Reason: The Jurisprudence of Robert 
Alexy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) 115.
102. Robert Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights, translated by Julian Rivers (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2002) at 66.
103. For academic contributions, see ibid; David M Beatty, The Ultimate Rule of Law (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2004); Alec Stone Sweet & Jud Matthews, “Proportionality 
Balancing and Global Constitutionalism” (2008) 47:1 Colum J Transnat’l L 72. For critical 
Canadian cases, see R v Oakes, [1986] 1 SCR 103 at 138-39, [1986] SCJ No 7 (discussing 
proportionality and section 1 of the Charter); Bedford, supra note 73 at paras 96-98 
(discussing section 7 of the Charter); Tsilhqot’in Nation v British Columbia, 2014 SCC 44 at 
para 80, [2014] 2 SCR 257 (discussing section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982).
104. Lawrence Solum calls this the “fixation thesis.” See Lawrence B Solum, “The Fixation Thesis: 
The Role of Historical Fact in Original Meaning” (2015–2016) 91:1 Notre Dame L Rev 1.
105. For an example of the indiscriminate use of pre- and post-enactment usage, see Daniels v 
Canada (Indian Affairs and Northern Development), 2016 SCC 12 at paras 24-36, [2016] SCJ 
No 12 [Daniels]. The emphasis on post-1867 usage in Daniels is somewhat surprising because 
it cuts against the Court’s decision: Colonial discourse was more likely to distinguish between 
“Indians” and “Métis” after 1867 than before.
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shed evidentiary light on the ultimately important factual question of what the 
text meant when it was adopted.
The extension, on the other hand, depends on descriptive and prescriptive 
propositions. Since these may change either in reality or in perception, 
construction can quite properly change as well. For a practice of interpretation 
to be originalist in any sense, the extension as revealed in the decisional law 
must, to some degree, be constrained by the intension as encoded at the original 
moment of text formation or adoption.106 But new originalists have no a priori 
commitment to the determinateness of that constraint. Once we recognize the 
possibility of deliberate vagueness, the constraint might be extremely loose. 
Philosophical and policy arguments may be relevant at this stage, as may the 
broader conception of “history” of an unfolding tradition.107
So while the intension of “cruel and unusual punishment” in the Eighth 
Amendment (or in section 12 of the Charter) must, for new originalists, remain 
the same from the time of adoption to the time of adjudication (perhaps, 
as a punishment inconsistent with “civilized standards”108), twenty-first century 
Americans need not accept the factual, prudential, and moral assumptions that 
led their eighteenth-century counterparts to overwhelmingly conclude that 
hanging is consistent with the guarantee against such punishments. That is 
because the intension of that constitutional provision is a principle or perhaps a 
standard—not a rule—and the application of a principle or standard can change 
without a change in the principle or standard itself. Of course, the intension of a 
requirement that the US President be at least 35 years of age,109 or that a general 
census occur in Canada every ten years,110 allows for less in the way of reasonable 
disagreement about application because, in those cases, the text encodes a rule.111
The distinction between interpretation and construction allowed the new 
originalists to avoid the social-change objection: If changes in technology and 
society are relevant to the application of the legal norm, then they must be taken 
into account. As Justice Scalia put it, “A 19th-century statute criminalizing the 
106. Solum refers to this as the “constraint principle.” See Lawrence B Solum, The Constraint 
Principle: Original Meaning and Constitutional Practice [forthcoming].
107. For the purpose of this article, I will generally refer to the use of “history” as being about 
the time of adoption. I am thankful to an anonymous reviewer for pointing out that 
there is another use of “history” whose relevance a new originalist would limit to the 
construction stage.
108. Estelle v Gamble, 429 US 97 at 102 (1976).
109. US Const, art II, § 1.
110. Constitution Act, 1867, supra note 1, s 8.
111. Frederick Schauer, “Easy Cases” (1985) 58:1&2 S Cal L Rev 399.
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theft of goods is not ambiguous in its application to the theft of microwave 
ovens.”112 New originalism does not altogether eliminate the dead-hand-of-the-
past objection, however, since the present generation is still bound to use the 
standard, principle, or rule established by the founding generation. But at least 
the force of the objection is reduced since, in most cases, the semantic meaning 
gives the present generation much to do. In any event, the dead-hand-of-the-past 
objection can be levied at any written constitution that confines the discretion 
of current majorities: If what matters most is flexibility, the Constitution of the 
United Kingdom, with its paramount principle of Parliamentary sovereignty, 
delivers in spades. The constitutional question is not usually whether there will 
be flexibility for future generations, but rather who will exercise it. Courts should 
exercise flexibility within the sphere the constitution gives them, but surely 
everyone should be uneasy with the idea that there is no constraint on the courts 
deciding what that sphere is. New originalism acknowledges the legitimacy of 
judicial flexibility when the historically enacted text is irreducibly vague—as, 
of course, it usually is.
What, then, are the arguments for the new originalist approach? Old-style 
originalists relied heavily on democratic arguments about the need to constrain 
judicial discretion and respect legislative choice, but these arguments are not as 
available to new originalists since it is perfectly possible that the intension of 
a constitutional provision is to create judicial discretion and narrow legislative 
choice. But new originalists are able to rely on a very powerful argument from the 
fundamental features of constitutional norms: that they are supreme and that they 
are entrenched. If constitutional texts are supreme, then they are supreme over 
even their most authoritative interpreters, namely the final court of appeal.113 But 
this requires that there be some external reference point as to what the text means 
other than what the judges say it means. New originalism provides that reference 
point without making it implausibly determinate. Moreover, entrenchment 
implies that constitutions can only be changed through the use of the prescribed 
amending procedures. Since the amending procedures do not provide for change 
by judicial fiat, entrenchment implies that there must be something that judges 
cannot change by their own legitimate activity, even if the constitution gives 
them some legitimate activity in which to be engaged (called, by new originalists, 
112. K Mart Corp v Cartier Inc, 486 US 281 (1988) at 323.
113. British Columbia v Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd, 2005 SCC 49 at para 60, [2005] 2 SCR 
473 (stating that the rule of law requires that the judicial branch be constrained by law).
(2016) 53 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL768
constitutional construction). The fixation thesis means that this something can be 
specified, at least in principle, without reference to subsequent judicial activity.114
Although the logical implications of supremacy and entrenchment are the 
fundamental point, new originalism can also embrace other normative arguments. 
If even the sense of a constitution is whatever the courts say it is, a person seeking 
to criticize jurisprudence from the outside is just making a conceptual error. 
To say that the SCC inaccurately stated constitutional law would be like saying 
a statute of the UK Parliament is not the law in Britain: It would not make sense 
within the system.115 However, external intellectual or popular criticism has in fact 
played an important role in constitutional development, as demonstrated by the 
impact that Kennedy, MacDonald, and Scott had on federalism jurisprudence. 
They did not simply argue that the Judicial Committee’s decisions were unwise; 
they also argued that they were contrary to the true meaning of the Constitution. 
This latter criticism requires an external standard of meaning, which both new 
and old originalism can deliver but an unconstrained living constitution cannot.
Another normative argument depends on the legitimacy of the political 
moment in which the text was created. If constitutional provisions were 
adopted at periods of high political mobilization and approved by a broader set 
of actors than a single national majority, then that broader-than-usual consent 
is normatively relevant to the authority of that constitution. It would seem to 
follow that the scope of that broader consent should constrain the interpretation 
of the text that results. The force of this argument depends on the process by 
which the constitutional text came to be enacted. It is always a fiction to say 
a constitution represents the factual consent of “the people,” since individuals 
who did not agree to it were still bound to it at the moment of enactment, 
and subsequent generations did not agree to it at all. But the normative force 
of consent is not necessarily absent when it is imperfect. First, there is a strong 
argument that provisions adopted by supermajorities or representatives of 
divergent interests will have epistemic advantages over laws passed through 
ordinary majoritarian processes. Norms that are the product of a broad consensus 
after intense deliberation are, as a probabilistic matter, likely to be better grounded 
epistemically than narrowly majoritarian decisions occurring in the context of 
ordinary politics. This implies that the courts should try to give effect to the 
provision as that regionally diverse supermajority understood it, if not give it the 
114. This argument is made most rigorously in Jeffrey Goldsworthy, “The Case for Originalism” in 
Huscroft & Miller, supra note 44 at 42.
115. In both cases, a critic could dispute the prudence or morality of the SCC decision or statute. 
But it would be an error to say it did not accurately reflect the positive law.
MORLEY,  DEAD HANDS, LIVING TREES, HISTORIC COMpROMISES 769
effects the supermajority expected.116 Second, if there are normatively important 
divergences of interest within the constituted community, an agreement between 
representatives of those interests will have to protect those interests to some 
extent. While that bargain might be renegotiated in a similar process, if the 
mutual agreement was necessarily for legitimacy in the first place, the bargain 
can no more be legitimately rewritten by a simple majority vote of the highest 
court of appeal than of the central legislature.
While old originalism, at least in the American context, had politically and 
jurisprudentially conservative implications, the same is not necessarily the case 
for new originalism. For the most important (and vaguest) provisions, results 
in particular cases depend more on background presumptions and factual and 
normative assumptions about the world than on the unchanging historical sense 
of the textual provisions. Keith Whittington favours judicial restraint; Randy 
Barnett is a libertarian in favour of a highly activist court; Jack Balkin is a 
progressive liberal.117 All three are new originalists.118
In its early formulation, originalism was clearly a purely normative theory: 
Berger and Bork certainly did not think they were describing the behaviour of 
the US Supreme Court. They were objecting to it. Most new originalists continue 
to see themselves as primarily normative in orientation to judicial practice. But 
some new originalists go beyond arguing that the courts should decide in an 
originalist manner, and have argued that they already do.119 It is no doubt true 
that liberal justices in the United States are now capable of speaking in new 
originalist tones. For example, in her confirmation hearing, Justice Elena Kagan, 
a reliably progressive vote in disputed constitutional cases, succinctly stated the 
new originalist position and gave her approval: “Sometimes [the framers] laid 
down very specific rules. Sometimes they laid down specific principles. Either 
way, we do what they said. In that sense, we are all originalists.”120 There have 
116. See John O McGinnis & Michael B Rappaport, Originalism and the Good Constitution 
(Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2013). McGinnis and Rappaport favour a 
brand of originalism they call “original methods originalism” and which they distinguish 
from new originalism. However, the argument that a supermajority has epistemic advantages 
over normal majorities is a general normative argument for originalism.
117. Balkin, Living Originalism, supra note 14.
118. Whittington, “The New Originalism,” supra note 12; Barnett, supra note 94; Balkin, Living 
Originalism, supra note 14.
119. See e.g. William Baude, “Is Originalism Our Law?” (2015) 115:3 Colum L Rev 2349.
120. Jason Reed, “Kagan Confirmation Hearings: Day Two” The Wall Street Journal (29 
June 2010), online: <http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704103904575
336790488403182>.
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been originalist defences of all the major progressive decisions that got Bork and 
Berger exercised in the first place.121
Skeptics may wonder whether new originalists have transformed an interesting 
perspective on judicial practice into a purely semantic relabeling of it. There is no 
such thing as a free lunch, and it may be objected that what new originalism gains 
in plausibility it loses in usefulness. Once the new originalist moves have been 
accepted, it is not clear what difference they make. If the original meaning of the 
text is abstract, then it is possible to mount a new originalist defence of almost 
any result. New originalism in effect licences all of Phillip Bobbitt’s modalities 
of constitutional interpretation—the historical, textual, structural, doctrinal, 
ethical, and prudential122—so long as the last four are referred to as modalities 
of construction.
One difference with Bobbitt’s unrestricted pluralism is that new originalism 
holds that the analysis of the modalities must occur in a sequence: It is the 
intension of the text, in its historical context, that gives rise to the legal content. 
So interpreted, the legal content may licence ethical and prudential—what the 
Canadian jurisprudence would call “purposive”123—inquiries. These inquiries, 
in the context of adversarial litigation, will lead to a line of precedents, which 
should, to the extent possible, fit together (Bobbitt’s “doctrinal” modality124). 
So, new originalism still insists that the text and history must come first, 
if not in order of importance, at least in order of consideration—at least to the 
extent the constitutional decision can honestly be said to be pursuant to the 
constitutional text.
It will still be objected that in many cases, none of this will constrain judicial 
discretion all that much. But this problem is not unique to originalism: Any 
jurisprudential theory faces a trade-off between descriptive plausibility and 
normative bite. If a theory is presented as a way of explaining how the results of 
the judicial system are actually reached (even if the judges themselves are unaware 
that they are following the theory), then (1) the theory must be indeterminate 
enough to explain any actual result, and (2) the theorist cannot complain that 
a judge has failed to follow the theory. One cannot consistently use the same 
theory to explain and critique judicial decisions. Simply explaining may be fine 
121. For some examples, see Michael W McConnell, “Originalism and the Desegregation 
Decisions” (1995) 81:4 Va L Rev 947 (arguing that Brown was consistent with original 
meaning); Jack Balkin, “Abortion and Original Meaning” (2007) 24:2 Const Commentary 
291 (arguing that Roe was consistent with original meaning).
122. Philip Bobbitt, Constitutional Interpretation (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991) at 12-13.
123. Hunter, supra note 4 at 156.
124. Supra note 122 at 13.
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for a purely social scientific enterprise, but obviously does not work if the theorist 
has an ambition to influence the results the judicial system reaches. On the other 
hand, a highly prescriptive normative theory runs the risk of being too doctrinaire 
for actual practice. Advocates must of course adopt any plausible argument that 
looks helpful to their client’s cause, whether it fits with a theoretical perspective 
or not. Judges also tend to argue that their resolution of a case is supported by all 
possible considerations. As a result, legal practice is likely to be more eclectic than 
the theoretically minded would like, and however much American law has moved 
in the direction of paying greater attention to the historical meaning of the US 
Constitution’s terms, it is in no danger of becoming purist. As Scalia himself 
said, “I am a textualist, I am an originalist. I am not a nut.”125 Of course, by not 
being a “nut,” Scalia opened himself up to the charge of motivated reasoning. 
For his critics, Scalia’s originalism and textualism were abandoned for congenial 
conservative results.126
Both at the “high” level of theory and in judicial and legal practice, 
Americans broadly associated with new originalism are continuing to debate 
how determinate their method really is. These debates are both philosophical and 
historical. But it seems that the basic insight—that the level of determinateness is 
itself a question constitution makers have a choice about—is unlikely to be lost.
III. CAN ORIGINALISM COME TO CANADA? HAS IT?
The new originalists’ most general normative arguments apply just as well to 
Canada as to the United States—indeed, they may apply better. Like the 
Constitution of the United States, Canada’s Constitution is explicitly supreme 
and entrenched. There is an amending formula that sets out how the Constitution 
can be changed: In no case is it either sufficient or necessary to obtain a majority 
of the final court of appeal. This implies that there must be something the final 
court of appeal cannot change. Indeed, section 52(3) of the Constitution Act, 
1982 spells this out: “Amendments to the Constitution of Canada shall be 
made only in accordance with the authority contained in the Constitution of 
Canada.”127 Judges who do not recognize a historically-fixed constraint of some 
125. Molly McDonough, “Scalia: ‘I Am Not a Nut’” ABA Journal (8 April 2008), online:  
<http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/scalia_im_not_a_nut/>.
126. Cass R Sunstein, “Antonin Scalia, Living Constitutionalist” (2016) 130 Harv L 
Rev [forthcoming].
127. Constitution Act, 1982, supra note 2, s 52(3) [emphasis added].
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kind are, on Goldsworthy’s difficult-to-answer argument,128 flaunting the very 
text that empowers them.
The supermajoritarian argument has peculiarly Canadian resonances as well. 
The decisions of a supermajority command special respect both because they 
presumably correspond to the interests of a wider group of people and represent 
the epistemic advantages of diversity and greater deliberation. The constitutional 
settlements of both 1867 and 1982 were the products of moments of great 
mobilization and debate, and of compromise across regional and ideological 
lines. The narrative of “compact” has long had resonance in Canada.129 The 1982 
Constitution emerged as it did precisely because the SCC insisted that there 
was a constitutional convention requiring that major changes obtain “substantial 
provincial … consent,”130 and the Trudeau government postponed its attempt 
to bring its amendment package out unilaterally to see if such consent could 
be obtained. This conventional requirement of provincial consent suggests that 
what the provinces consented to matters for interpretative purposes—with the 
recognition that by accepting vague rights guarantees, they must have consented 
to substantial judicial freedom in application and construction. In addition to 
the provinces, the consent of aboriginal and women’s groups was demonstrably 
important to the 1982 Constitutional settlement.
To be sure, as in the United States, there are problems with an idealized 
account of the constitutional text as the product of unproblematic consent. 
Confederation, like the US Constitution, was the product of a debate limited 
to white men within the framework of an explicitly imperialist order. But where 
the 1789 constitutional settlement was a compromise within a single ethnic 
group divided primarily by the institution of slavery, the 1867 compromise 
at least involved compromise across ethnic and religious lines. The 1982 
compromise is, of course, controversial to this day because it was rejected by 
the Quebec National Assembly—a defect in legitimacy that subsequent rounds 
of constitutional reform were unable to correct. But questions about original 
legitimacy exist for the United States as well: The original Constitution was a 
pact with slaveholders, while the Reconstruction Amendments were imposed 
through military force. Notwithstanding its defects, the Canadian constitutional 
128. Goldsworthy, supra note 114.
129. Grammond, supra note 49.
130. Re: Resolution to amend the Constitution, [1981] 1 SCR 753 at 784, [1981] SCJ No 
58 [Patriation Reference]. See also Re: Objection by Quebec to a Resolution to amend the 
Constitution, [1982] 2 SCR 793, [1982] SCJ No 101 [Quebec Veto Reference cited to SCR]. 
In that case, the Court stated that the conventional requirement of substantial provincial 
consent did not go so far as to require the consent of the province of Quebec (ibid at 806).
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adoption processes were still special ones, resulting in the adoption of a complex 
amending formula setting out exactly what consent of what legislative bodies 
would be required to amend it further. To the extent the new originalism is a 
“living originalism,”131 it would seem to escape the traditional Canadian critiques, 
which, as we have seen, essentially recapitulated the points made by Brest and 
others in the American context.
How does new originalism fare as a descriptive theory of how Canadian courts 
act? There are relatively few examples of descriptive new originalist scholarship 
in Canada, although in one of the few Canadian examples of this genre, Justice 
Bertha Wilson, the most progressive of interpreters of the Charter during the 
Court’s most ‘heroic’ phase, has been described as an originalist—which at least 
suggests a descriptive originalism could be developed for any of the other SCC 
justices in the Charter era.132 As we have seen, the reception of old originalism 
by 1980s-era Canadian courts was hostile. However, the claim that the SCC 
absolutely rejects an originalist approach is overstated, both by impatient 
orginalists and by strong supporters of progressive interpretation. It is more 
accurate to consider the Court’s approach to history as pluralistic. Even Chief 
Justice Dickson stated that “the Charter was not enacted in a vacuum” and should 
be “placed in its proper linguistic, philosophic and historic contexts.”133 The living 
tree metaphor means only that the past “plays a critical but non-exclusive role” 
in determining the content of even the rights-guaranteeing provisions of the 
Constitution.134 The contours of section 96 of the Constitution Act, 1867 depend 
on a historical assessment of practices of the superior courts in the confederating 
provinces in 1867 that new originalists would reject as pedantic.135 Some of the 
provisions of the Constitution explicitly refer to the legal situation at the time the 
131. Balkin, Living Originalism, supra note 14.
132. Adam M Dodek, “The Dutiful Conscript: An Originalist View of Justice Wilson’s 
Conception of Charter Rights and Their Limits” (2008) 41 Sup Ct L Rev (2d) 331.
133. R v Big M Drug Mart Ltd, [1985] 1 SCR 295 at 344, [1985] SCJ No 17 [Big M] 
[emphasis added].
134. Reference re Prov Electoral Boundaries (Sask), [1991] 2 SCR 158 at 180, [1991] SCJ No 46 
[Saskatchewan Electoral Boundaries Reference].
135. Sobeys Stores Ltd v Yeomans, [1989] 1 SCR 238 at 261-67, [1989] SCJ No 13 [Sobeys Stores]. 
According to Sobeys Stores, a court trying to determine whether a law falls afoul of section 96 
of the Constitution Act, 1867 is to compare the jurisdiction given to a statutory tribunal with 
the jurisdictions exercised by superior, district, or county courts in the four confederating 
provinces in 1867. If these differed, the court is to look at whether the jurisdiction was 
exercised in three or more of those provinces. If the jurisdiction was exercised in only two 
provinces, practice in England in 1867 is used as a tie-breaker. This is obviously originalism 
at a highly concrete level.
(2016) 53 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL774
provision was enacted.136 In 2003, the Court stated it was “not free to invent new 
obligations foreign to the original purpose of the provision at issue,” an original 
purpose that must be determined from “historical context.”137
In the context of official language, denominational, and treaty rights, 
reference to what was agreed at the time the rights were created seems 
inevitable, and the courts have returned repeatedly to the history of adoption for 
interpretative guidance. Unfortunately, this has sometimes been accompanied 
by the inference that these rights, because they are historically grounded, are less 
important—an implication that has led the judicial champions of these rights to 
defensiveness. In the 1986 language rights trilogy,138 Justice Beetz distinguished 
“universal” legal rights that are “seminal in nature because they are rooted in 
principle” from language rights “based on political compromise.”139 The result 
for Justice Beetz was that “political compromise” rights should be approached 
with greater restraint than the “universal” rights.140 In rejecting the legacy of the 
trilogy,141 Justice Bastarache—a champion of language rights both before and 
after appointment to the Court—pointed out that constitutional language rights 
are not unique in resulting from political compromise.142 This could have led 
to a recognition that the framework of political compromise is relevant to the 
interpretation of those “universal” rights as well, but instead Justice Bastarache 
136. See e.g., Constitution Act, 1867, supra note 1, s 18 (stating that the privileges of the Senate 
and House of Commons are not to exceed those of the UK House of Commons “at the 
passing of such Act”); ibid, s 93(2) (stating that denominational rights at the time of union 
are preserved and that those of separate schools in Ontario extended to dissentient schools 
in Quebec). Section 93(2) was repealed by SI/97-141, (1997) C Gaz II, 308 (Constitutional 
Amendment, 1997 (Québec)).
137. R v Blais, 2003 SCC 44 at para 40, [2003] 2 SCR 236.
138. Société des Acadiens du Nouveau-Brunswick v Assn of Parents for Fairness in Education, Grand 
Falls District 50 Branch, [1986] 1 SCR 549, [1986] SCJ No 26 (holding that the right to 
plead in an official language under section 19(2) of the Charter does not imply a right to 
be understood) [Société des Acadiens cited to SCR]; MacDonald v City of Montreal, [1986] 1 
SCR 460, [1986] SCJ No 28 (holding that there is no right to receive a process issued from 
a court in one’s own language under section 133 of the Constitution Act, 1867); Bilodeau v 
Manitoba (Attorney General), [1986] 1 SCR 449, [1986] SCJ No 27 (holding that there is no 
right to receive a process issued from a court in one’s own language under section 23 of the 
Manitoba Act, 1870, 33 Vict, c 3 (Canada)).
139. Société des Acadiens, supra note 138 at 577-78.
140. Ibid at 578.
141. R v Beaulac, [1999] 1 SCR 768, [1999] SCJ No 25 [Beaulac cited to SCR]; 
Arsenault-Cameron v Prince Edward Island, 2000 SCC 1, [2000] 1 SCR 3.
142. Beaulac, supra note 141 at 790.
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insisted that “the existence of a political compromise is without consequence 
with regard to the scope of language rights.”143
More recent language rights cases show that the proponents of wide readings 
of language rights can ground their arguments in history. In Caron, three 
justices would have overruled one of Justice Beetz’s language rights decisions 
holding that there are no French language rights in Alberta or Saskatchewan,144 
primarily based on the argument that it misread the history of the constitutional 
enactments.145 The majority upheld the earlier decision holding that there was 
no constitutional requirement that laws in Alberta be written in French.146 But 
they did so with far more attention to the original understanding of the text than 
Justice Beetz had shown.
Even in relation to the so-called “universal rights” in the Charter, the Court 
has looked at the political compromise implied by the creation of rights review, 
with a limitation clause and override, in defending its role making controversial 
decisions.147 This is the sort of argument of which new originalists would approve. 
Moreover, the most methodologically sophisticated division of powers case in 
the twenty-first century, the Employment Insurance Act Reference,148 is consistent 
with new, but not with old, originalism. That case involved the interpretation 
of section 91(2A) of the Constitution Act, 1867 (“Unemployment insurance”)149 
and whether it authorized Parliament to enact an income replacement scheme 
for work lost as a result of pregnancy, adoption, or care of a new born. Justice 
Deschamps rejected an “original intent” approach to the heads of power 
enumerated in sections 91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867,150 but at the 
143. Ibid at 791. In my view, Justice Bastarache is required to return to the history of political 
compromise to justify some propositions about language rights that are important to him, 
including the irrelevance of cost and administrative inconvenience outside section 23 and the 
priority of the official languages over other minority languages—but full justification of this 
assertion is outside the scope of this article.
144. R v Mercure, [1988] 1 SCR 234, [1988] SCJ No 11.
145. Caron v Alberta, 2015 SCC 56, [2015] 3 SCR 511 [Caron].
146. Ibid.
147. Vriend v Alberta, [1998] 1 SCR 493 at 563, [1998] SCJ No 29 (“We should recall that it 
was the deliberate choice of our provincial and federal legislatures in adopting the Charter 
to assign an interpretive role to the courts and to command them under s. 52 to declare 
unconstitutional legislation invalid”).
148. Supra note 3.
149. Supra note 1, s 91(2A).
150. Employment Insurance Act Reference, supra note 3 at para 9.
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same time insisted that the courts must “refer to the framers’ description of the 
power in order to identify its essential components.”151
Section 91(2A) was added by the Constitution Act, 1940152 in direct response 
to the Reference re: Employment and Social Insurance Act (Can),153 in which the 
Judicial Committee struck down Prime Minister Bennett’s attempt to respond to 
the Great Depression by setting up a federal unemployment insurance scheme. 
When legislation was enacted under section 91(2A), it not only did not include 
maternity or parental benefits, but excluded women for two years after they were 
married.154 Obviously, it would be unacceptable to restrict Parliament’s authority 
under section 91(2A) to a statute that, in every detail, matched this original 
application—and, unsurprisingly, Justice Deschmaps rejected this idea of 
originalism. She did not, however, ignore history, referring to federal-provincial 
negotiations on the scope of the power. Instead, she treated it at a higher level of 
abstraction, defining unemployment insurance as a “public insurance program 
based on the concept of social risk … the purpose of which is to preserve workers’ 
economic security and ensure their reentry into the labour market … by paying 
temporary income replacement benefits … in the event of an interruption of 
employment.”155 This more abstract definition was justified with reference to a 
1937 letter from Prime Minister Mackenzie King to the Premier of Quebec.156 
She then applied this relatively abstract definition to legislation for pregnancy, 
parental, and adoption benefits, finding that it was met. Justice Deschamps’ 
approach is consistent with the new originalist distinction between interpretation 
and construction, as well as its use of a relatively abstract conception of 
historical meaning.
Any claims of descriptive originalism must be modest. The Court has never 
expressly embraced originalism, although it also rarely says anything negative.157 
The Court has not tried to theorize what the “critical but non-exclusive”158 role of 
the history of the text should be, nor has it tried to engage with the developments 
151. Ibid at para 10.
152. For the original legislation, see British North America Act, 1940, 3-4 Geo VI, c 36 (UK) 
[Constitution Act, 1940].
153. [1937] AC 355, [1937] 1 DLR 684 (PC).
154. Employment Insurance Act Reference, supra note 3 at para 19.
155. Ibid at para 48.
156. Ibid at para 41.
157. Justice Binnie is responsible for the only two uses of the word “originalism” in the Supreme 
Court Reports. See R v Tessling, 2004 SCC 67 at para 61, [2004] 3 SCR 432; Consolidated 
Fastfrate Inc v Western Canada Council of Teamsters, 2009 SCC 53 at para 89, [2009] 3 SCR 
407, Binnie J, dissenting. In both cases, he uses the word pejoratively.
158. Saskatchewan Electoral Boundaries Reference, supra note 134 at 180.
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in originalist theory in the United States—even in cases such as the Employment 
Insurance Reference, where this theory might have proven useful. For the work 
of adjudicating rights and most division of powers disputes, this has perhaps 
not proven necessary. But 2014 was to show that too little theory and too little 
history have their costs when it comes to structural provisions—like those of the 
amending formula—that cannot escape their origins. In describing the two 2014 
References in detail, I hope to show not only that the Court found it necessary 
to go to originalist ideas to make sense of what it was being asked to decide, but 
also that it could have negotiated these issues better if it had engaged with the 
more sophisticated versions of originalism developing south of the 49th parallel.
IV. THE 2014 REFERENCES
A. THE SUPREME COURT ACT REFERENCE
The Supreme Court Act Reference arose as a result of Prime Minister Harper’s 
decision to appoint Justice Marc Nadon of the Federal Court of Appeal to replace 
Justice Morris Fish on the SCC. The Supreme Court Act states that a minimum 
of three SCC Justices “shall be appointed from among the judges of the Court of 
Appeal or of the Superior Court of the Province of Quebec or from among the 
advocates of that Province,” or, in French, “Au moins trois des juges sont choisis 
parmi les juges de la Cour d’appel ou de la Cour supérieure de la province de 
Québec ou parmi les avocats de celle-ci.”159 Justice Fish was one of the three. 
While Justice Nadon had been a member of the Barreau du Québec for nineteen 
years as a practicing lawyer, this ended with his appointment as a Federal Court 
judge in 1993.160 Since he was clearly not a judge of the Court of Appeal or of the 
Superior Court of Quebec, the validity of his appointment turned on whether a 
nominee for one of the Quebec seats on the Court must be “among the advocates 
of the Province” at the time of appointment or if it is sufficient that the nominee 
was among those advocates at some earlier date.
Justice Nadon was sworn in as a Justice of the SCC on 7 October 2013. 
Toronto lawyer Rocco Galati filed a challenge to the appointment in the Federal 
Court the same day. As a result of the challenge, Justice Nadon declined to sit 
on any cases.161 The federal government reacted on 21 October. First, it included 
159. Supreme Court Act, RSC 1985, c S-26, s 6 [Supreme Court Act].
160. “The Honourable Marc Nadon” Federal Court of Appeal (9 September 2015), online: <http://
cas-cdc-www02.cas-satj.gc.ca/portal/page/portal/fca-caf_eng/judges-juges_eng/nadon_eng>.
161. Supreme Court Act Reference, supra note 7 at paras 9-10.
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in its omnibus Bill C-4 two clauses that purported to give “greater certainty” 
to sections 5 and 6 of the Supreme Court Act.162 The more important of the two 
clauses was clause 472, which added a new section 6.1: “For greater certainty, for 
the purpose of section 6, a judge is from among the advocates of the Province 
of Quebec if, at any time, they were an advocate of at least 10 years standing at 
the bar of that Province.”163 If valid, the new section 6.1 would have resolved the 
matter in favour of Justice Nadon.
The federal government simultaneously referred to the SCC the 
following questions:
1. Can a person who was, at any time, an advocate of at least 10 years 
standing at the Barreau du Québec be appointed to the Supreme 
Court of Canada as a member of the Supreme Court from Quebec 
pursuant to sections 5 and 6 of the Supreme Court Act?
2. Can Parliament enact legislation that requires that a person be 
or has previously been a barrister or advocate of at least 10 years 
standing at the bar of a province as a condition of appointment 
as a judge of the Supreme Court of Canada or enact the annexed 
declaratory provisions as set out in clauses 471 and 472 of the Bill 
entitled Economic action Plan 2013 Act, No. 2?164
The first question seems, at first glance (although not necessarily on deeper 
analysis), to be a simple question of statutory interpretation. Whether a condition 
in a statute requires that a person have the status at the time the provision is 
to operate or at any time is typical of the issues that arise when lawyers argue 
about how statutes should be applied—and that modern drafters try to address 
explicitly for that reason. At least if the Supreme Court Act were treated as an 
ordinary statute, this issue would be nothing special from a jurisprudential point 
of view—despite the obvious importance to the operations of the Court and to 
the Harper government.
The second question, in contrast, raised a fundamental question about the 
constitutional status of the SCC. Since there is no doubt that any power to 
162. Bill C-4, Economic Action Plan 2013 Act, No 2, 2d Sess, 41st Parl, 2013, cls 471-72 (assented 
to 12 December 2013), SC 2013, c 40 [Bill C-4].
163. Ibid, cl 472. Bill C-4 received royal assent after the questions in the reference were set but 
before argument or judgment.
164. Supreme Court Act Reference, supra note 7 at para 7.
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legislate with respect to the SCC lies with the federal Parliament,165 a negative 
answer to the second question would necessarily imply that there are some 
aspects of the law governing the SCC about which no ordinary legislation is 
permissible, and so are constitutionally entrenched. This issue had engendered 
intense academic debate, arising out of the anomaly in the Constitution Act, 1982 
in which changes to the SCC are clearly provided for in the amending formula, 
but the establishment, composition, and jurisdiction of the Court are set out in 
an ordinary federal statute.166
In contrast to article 3 of the US Constitution (“The judicial power of the 
United States, shall be vested in one Supreme Court…”),167 the Constitution 
Act, 1867 did not specifically entrench a final court of appeal. Instead, it gave 
the federal Parliament the authority to “from Time to Time provide for the 
Constitution, Maintenance, and Organization of a General Court of Appeal for 
Canada.”168 The federal Parliament exercised this authority in 1875 by enacting 
the Supreme Court Act, but the SCC remained a mere intermediate appellate 
court until appeals to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council were 
abolished in 1949.169 From that point on, the SCC became the authoritative 
final interpreter of the Constitution and therefore had the final say on the line 
between federal and provincial legislative jurisdiction. Its legitimacy in this 
role was in obvious tension with its apparent status as a creature of the federal 
Parliament. Unsuccessful attempts at constitutional reform, both before and 
after the 1981–1982 settlement, included provisions entrenching the SCC. 
Part IV of the 1971 Victoria Charter would have entrenched the SCC (with 
articles 24 and 25 reproducing sections 5 and 6 of the Supreme Court Act), while 
avoiding the textual ambiguity that gave rise to the dispute about Justice Nadon’s 
165. Reference re: The Manitoban Mechanics’ and Wage Earners’ Lien Act, [1908] AC 504, [1908] 
JCJ No 3 (PC) (holding that provincial legislatures have no power to limit the jurisdiction of 
the SCC); Reference as to the Legislative Competence of the Parliament of Canada to Enact Bill 
No 9, Entitled “An Act to Amend the Supreme Court Act”, [1940] SCR 49; Ontario (Attorney 
General) v Canada (Attorney General), [1947] AC 127 at 153, [1947] 1 DLR 801 (PC) 
[Ontario v Canada].
166. Warren J Newman, “The Constitutional Status of the Supreme Court of Canada” (2009) 
47 Sup Ct L Rev (2d) 429 (describing the debate as it had developed in the years before the 
Court’s eventual decision).
167. Supra note 1, art III, § 1.
168. Constitution Act, 1867, supra note 1, s 101.
169. Act to amend the Supreme Court Act, SC 1949, c 37 (2d Sess), s 3.
(2016) 53 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL780
appointment.170 The Meech Lake and Charlottetown constitutional Accords of 
1987 and 1992, respectively, included similar language entrenching the Court.171
However, the Constitution Act, 1982—the only successful attempt to 
fundamentally reform the Canadian Constitution—was developed without a 
clear consensus about what to do with the Court. The SCC is not mentioned in 
the text outside the amending formula of Part V. The Supreme Court Act is not 
among the “Acts and orders” included within the “Constitution of Canada” by 
paragraph 52(2)(b).172 On the other hand, the amending procedures gave rise 
to a powerful inference that the SCC could not be altered except in accordance 
with its terms. Paragraph 41(d) provides that an amendment to the Constitution 
in relation to “the composition of the Supreme Court of Canada” must have 
unanimous consent of all the provincial legislative assemblies, as well as the 
Senate and House of Commons.173 Moreover, paragraph 42(1)(d) states that all 
other amendments in relation to the SCC must be made in accordance with 
the general amending formula, requiring resolutions of at least two-thirds of 
the provincial legislative assemblies representing a majority of the population of 
Canada, in addition to the houses of the federal Parliament.174
Some commentators, most notably Peter Hogg, concluded that since the 
written “Constitution of Canada,” as described in the Schedule, did no more 
than give the federal Parliament the power to constitute, maintain, and organize 
the Court, there was no legal limit on its power to change the SCC, without 
a constitutional amendment, as it saw fit—even to the point of abolishing it 
outright (although, of course, this would be politically untenable).175 Patrick 
Monahan, in contrast, argued that since Hogg’s interpretation would render 
paragraphs 41(d) and 42(1)(d) essentially meaningless, the fundamental features 
170. “Federal-Provincial First Ministers’ Conference, Victoria, British Columbia, June 14–16, 
1971” in Anne F Bayefsky, Canada’s Constitution Act 1982 & Amendments: A Documentary 
History (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1989) vol 1, 214 at 214-21. The Victoria Charter 
failed as a constitutional reform exercise when Quebec premier Robert Bourassa revoked his 
consent after consulting with his cabinet. See Strayer, supra note 75 at 48.
171. “Motion for a Resolution to Authorize an Amendment to the Constitution of Canada” 
(1987–1988) 17:1 Man LJ 113, Schedule, s 6 [“Meech Lake Accord”]; Electronic Frontier 
Canada, “Draft Legal Text, October 9, 1992” (8 September 1994) [unpublished], s 15, 
online: <http://www.efc.ca/pages/law/cons/Constitutions/Canada/English/Proposals/
CharlottetownLegalDraft.html> [“Charlottetown Accord”].
172. Constitution Act, 1982, supra note 2, s 52(2)(b), Schedule.
173. Ibid, s 41(d).
174. Ibid, s 42(1)(d).
175. Peter W Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 3d ed (Toronto: Thomson Canada, 
1992) at 79-80.
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and “key characteristics” of the Court—including the one-third representation of 
the province of Quebec among its members—must be beyond unilateral federal 
competence to alter.176 Subsection 52(2) uses the word “includes” rather than 
“means,”177 and therefore the written texts in the Schedule do not necessarily 
exhaust the scope of the “Constitution of Canada.”178
If the answer to the second question in the Supreme Court Act Reference 
implied that the rules of appointment to the Court were, in some fashion, 
constitutionally entrenched, then this might affect the approach to the first 
question as well. That is, the Supreme Court Act would no longer be an ordinary 
federal statute, but rather would embody some constitutionally entrenched 
features of the Court as well as some non-essential and therefore unconstitutional-
ized ones. Since constitutional interpretation is usually thought to operate under 
different principles than ordinary statutory interpretation, the interpretation of 
section 6 of the Supreme Court Act could be different depending on whether it 
was regarded as manifesting a constitutionalized feature of the Court.179
In its factum, the federal government tried to avoid explicitly taking Hogg’s 
position that there were absolutely no constitutional limits to what the federal 
Parliament could unilaterally change about the Court, pointing out that the 
“reference is not about the constitutional status of the Court or its fundamental 
features, including the number of judges of the Court who, by tradition or statute 
must be drawn from Quebec.”180 Still, the logic of the federal argument was Hogg’s. 
The federal government emphasized that the plenary power of Parliament under 
section 101 of the Constitution Act, 1867 had “never been limited, either through 
judicial interpretation or by constitutional amendment.”181 The amending 
formula did not itself bring about change to the substantive Constitution.182 
It therefore followed that Parliament could make any changes to the Supreme 
Court Act it wished, and only a constitutional amendment—which would 
176. Patrick J Monahan, Constitutional Law, 3d ed (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2006) at 193-94.
177. Constitution Act, 1982, supra note 2, s 52(2).
178. New Brunswick Broadcasting Co v Nova Scotia (Speaker of the House of Assembly), [1993] 1 
SCR 319 at 378, [1993] SCJ No 2; Reference re Remuneration of Judges of the Provincial Court 
of Prince Edward Island; Reference Re Independence and Impartiality of Judges of the Provincial 
Court of Prince Edward Island, [1997] 3 SCR 3 at para 92, [1997] SCJ No 75.
179. Supreme Court Act Reference, supra note 7 at para 19.
180. Reference re Supreme Court Act, ss 5 and 6, 2014 SCC 21, [2014] 1 SCR 433 
(Factum of the Appellant Attorney General of Canada at para 75), online: <http://
www.scc-csc.ca/WebDocuments-DocumentsWeb/35586/FM020_Appellant_
Attorney-General-of-Canada.pdf>.
181. Ibid at para 78.
182. Ibid at paras 85-86.
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have to be unanimous if it purported to limit Parliament’s ability to change 
the composition of the Court—could impose any limits on what Parliament 
could do: “Thus, until [a condition limiting appointment] is made a part of the 
Constitution, paragraphs 41(d) and 42(1)(d) do not operate to limit Parliament’s 
ability to legislate pursuant to section 101 of the 1867 Act.”183
A majority of the SCC characterized the federal government’s account 
of paragraphs 41(d) and 42(1)(d) of the Constitution Act, 1982 as the “empty 
vessels” theory of those provisions,184 and—not surprisingly in light of this 
characterization—rejected it.185 In the Court’s view, as in Monahan’s, paragraph 
41(d) implied that the existing practices regarding the composition of the 
Court—at least with respect to the presence of a minimum of three justices from 
Quebec—must be constitutionalized and could only be changed by unanimous 
consent,186 while paragraph 42(1)(d) implied that the other “essential features” of 
the SCC found in the Supreme Court Act (or perhaps elsewhere) could only be 
changed by ordinary constitutional amendment.187
In coming to this conclusion, the Court repeatedly relied on what the 
“framers”188 had “intended.”189 The majority’s reasoning on this point discussed 
the historical context from the time of Confederation to the final patriation deal. 
The Court noted that the first Macdonald government tried to introduce an SCC 
under the power in section 101 of the then-British North America Act on two 
occasions without any guarantee of members from Quebec, and was unsuccessful 
both times in light of opposition from Quebec MPs.190 The successful 1875 
bill, introduced under the Mackenzie government, included a requirement 
that two out of five justices be from Quebec to ensure competence in the 
distinctive civil law system of the province.191 The majority drew the inference 
that this was a necessary component of the political compromise that led to the 
establishment of the Court.192
The majority then discussed how the Court’s role grew in constitutional 
importance. First, the Privy Council became a critical player in the balance 
183. Ibid at para 86.
184. Supreme Court Act Reference, supra note 7 at para 97.
185. Ibid at para 98.
186. Ibid at para 93.
187. Ibid at para 94.
188. Ibid at para 98.
189. Ibid at para 99. In this crucial paragraph, the Court used “intended” twice and “agreed” once.
190. Ibid at para 79.
191. Ibid at paras 20-21.
192. Ibid at para 48.
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between the federal and provincial governments as judicial review displaced 
reservation-and-disallowance as the vehicle for deciding conflicts between the 
federal and provincial governments.193 A system of constitutional supremacy 
necessarily requires a final, authoritative decision-making body on interpretative 
issues, and vests that body with substantial power. The abolition of appeals 
to the Privy Council passed this role on to the SCC. The majority seemed to 
opine that this history itself, in effect, constitutionalized the Court, in light 
of the importance of the Court to the constitutional order after 1949.194 This 
argument is not entirely persuasive, however. It is certainly true that a system 
of constitutional review demands a final authoritative interpretative body 
if interpretative disputes are not to go on forever. But it does not require any 
particular such body, and certainly a final interpretative tribunal could survive 
whether only current or both current and former Quebec advocates could be 
appointed to the Quebec positions. At most, this structural argument supports 
the proposition that Parliament cannot abolish the Court or remove its status 
as a general court of appeal.195 The Privy Council, in upholding abolition of 
appeals to itself, held that Parliament’s power to amend the Supreme Court Act 
under section 101 was “unqualified and absolute,”196 and no subsequent case 
suggested otherwise.
The majority had more persuasive reasoning once it turned to the history 
of the patriation deal. The Court noted that the amending formula that came 
out of the 4–5 November 1981 agreement (which excluded Quebec) was itself 
derived from an earlier April 1981 compromise between the Gang of Eight.197 
In particular, both paragraphs 41(d) and 42(1)(d) derive directly from the April 
1981 Accord.198 The November 1981 deal—which, with the exception of the 
subsequent addition of what became sections 28 and 35, became the basis of 
the Constitution Act, 1982—involved the federal government accepting the April 
Accord amending formula, with a narrower right of compensation for a provincial 
government that opted out of a constitutional amendment, in exchange for 
193. Ibid at para 82.
194. Ibid at paras 83-85.
195. For this argument, see Newman, supra note 166.
196. Ontario v Canada, supra note 165 at 153.
197. Supreme Court Act Reference, supra note 7 at para 92.
198. Ibid at paras 92-94.
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the English-speaking dissenting provinces agreeing to the Charter including a 
notwithstanding clause.199
The dissenting provinces were unable to agree to changes in how the Court 
would be appointed or operate,200 but they did agree on how change would take 
place.201 Of course, what constitutes a “change” depends on how the status quo 
is characterized. As the federal government argued, one possible interpretation 
of the status quo was that the federal Parliament could unilaterally make any 
changes to the SCC that it saw fit. Another interpretation, though, was that the 
status quo was a Court essentially as it was at the beginning of the 1980s. There 
was thus an ambiguity in the interpretation of “an amendment in relation to the 
composition of the Supreme Court of Canada.”
A majority of the Court persuasively reasoned that the provinces—
particularly Quebec—could not possibly have had the federal meaning of 
“amendment” in mind when they agreed to the April Accord. The Court surmised 
that the requirement of unanimity for changes to the composition of the Court 
was a necessary concession to Quebec as part of the April Accord, in light of 
the importance of the representation of civil law-practicing justices to Quebec 
throughout the history of the country.202 The majority reasoned:
[The federal approach] would mean that  Parliament could unilaterally and 
fundamentally change the Court, including Quebec’s historically guaranteed 
representation, through ordinary legislation. Quebec, a signatory to the April 
Accord, would not have agreed to this, nor would have the other provinces.203
As a reconstruction of the political actors’ positions, the majority’s reasons 
on this point must be correct. Indeed, as the Court noted, the explanatory note 
to clause 9(d) of the April Accord made this point clear: “This clause [i.e., what 
later became paragraph 41(d)] would ensure that the Supreme Court of Canada 
is comprised of judges a proportion of whom are drawn from the Bar or Bench 
199. “Federal-Provincial First Ministers’ Conference, Ottawa, Ontario, November 2–5, 
1981” in Bayefsky, supra note 170, vol 2, 904. Roy Romanow, John Whyte & Howard 
Leeson, Canada… Notwithstanding: The Making of the Constitution 1976–1982 (Toronto: 
Carswell/Methuen, 1984) at 208 (outlining the content of the “kitchen accord” on 4 
November 1981).
200. Ibid at 94-97 (explaining how agreement on the Court was elusive at the Continuing 
Committee of Ministers on the Constitution meeting in August 1980, and how the matter 
was not returned to, except in context of the amending formula).
201. “Premiers’ Conference, Ottawa, Ontario, April 16, 1981” in Bayefsky, supra note 170, 
vol 2, 804 at 810.
202. Supreme Court Act Reference, supra note 7 at paras 92-93.
203. Ibid at para 99.
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of Quebec and are, therefore, trained in the civil law.”204 The acceptance of the 
amending formula, including paragraphs 41(d) and 42(1)(d), was a demand 
of the dissenting provinces and (ultimately) a concession by the Trudeau 
government in the course of an adversarial and often-acrimonious bargaining 
process.205 It would be inconsistent with this historical context to read these 
provisions as permanently entrenching (and in the case of the composition of 
the Court, super-entrenching) a unilateral power of the federal Parliament to do 
whatever it wanted.
The federal government had the better of the textual argument. By definition, 
amending procedures do not change substantive constitutional provisions (unless 
they are used, of course). Despite the use of the word “includes” in paragraph 
52(2) of the Constitution Act, 1982,206 it is surely desirable to have a finite list of the 
specific provisions of the Constitution of Canada that are entrenched and made 
supreme, and the Schedule fulfills that function. While it is arguably reasonable 
for the Court to ‘discover’ the broad “principles that animate”207 the Constitution 
without specific reference in the text, it would create an unacceptable degree of 
uncertainty if rules—especially those as technical as whether membership in a 
provincial bar is required at the time of appointment—were to be part of the 
“Constitution of Canada” despite their non-inclusion in the written instruments 
making up that constitution. The Court’s structural arguments do not really assist 
either. The need for a stable final court of appeal in a system of constitutional 
judicial review cannot resolve whether one level of government could change 
details about membership in provincial bars at time of appointment. Different 
systems of judicial review could easily disagree on this point. If there is a structural 
problem with the appointment process, it is not that the Prime Minister can 
nominate former members of the Quebec bar, but that the Prime Minister has 
the unilateral power of appointment at all. This was the structural problem that 
the Victoria Charter, Meech Lake, and Charlottetown all tried to address. The 
Court’s decision on the second question can only be defended as an historical—
and therefore, originalist—one.
By the same token, the SCC’s approach to the question of whether 
Parliament could ‘clarify’ the group of potential appointees also only makes sense 
204. Ibid at para 92. See also “Premiers’ Conference, Ottawa, Ontario, April 16, 1981” in 
Bayefsky, supra note 170, vol 2, 804 at 810.
205. Romanow, Whyte & Leeson, supra note 199, ch 4.
206. Supra note 2, s 52(2).
207. Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 SCR 217 at para 148, [1998] SCJ No 61 
[Secession Reference].
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on originalist grounds. There were several arguments, but the only persuasive one 
was a historical analysis of the origins of the Supreme Court Act. In light of the 
conclusion that the requirements of section 6 were constitutionalized, the Court 
determined that it should be read using constitutional, as opposed to statutory, 
principles of interpretation.208 It then gave four reasons why section 6 excludes 
former advocates, none of which impressed dissenting Justice Moldaver. The 
first reason was the “plain meaning” of section 6,209 which amounts, as plain 
meaning arguments generally do, to judicial intuition. The second was that the 
more restrictive interpretation of section 6 gave effect to the “is or has been” 
and “actuels ou anciens” language of section 5.210 Like most arguments that 
appeal to negative inferences, this one cuts both ways, in that the distinction 
drawn between sections 5 and 6 undermines the rationale for excluding former 
advocates of Quebec from appointment: If former members of the Manitoba 
bar are presumed to know enough common law to be potential SCC justices, 
why would former members of the Quebec bar be thought to not know enough 
civil law? The fourth argument—that appointing former members of the Quebec 
bar would conflict with a long-disused provision relating to the appointment of 
federal court judges as ad hoc judges of the SCC, according to which superior 
and appellate judges of the Quebec courts would have to be appointed instead 
in the event of an appeal from Quebec—was, by the majority’s admission, “not 
conclusive.”211 Interestingly, in discussing this reason for its decision, the majority 
went so far as to refer to the fact that the assistant judge of the Exchequer Court 
at the time the provision was written was, like Justice Nadon, from Quebec.212
For the purposes of this article, the third reason given by the majority for 
its decision on the first question in the Supreme Court Act Reference was the most 
important: that permitting the appointment of former members of the Quebec 
bar might undermine the purpose of the Quebec quota of ensuring knowledge 
of Quebec’s distinctive legal system.213 In fleshing out this purpose, the Court 
referred extensively to the parliamentary history of the original Supreme Court 
Act to establish the importance of this requirement for the general acceptance of 
a final court of appeal in Canada.
208. Supreme Court Act Reference, supra note 7 at para 19.
209. Ibid at para 39.
210. Ibid at para 41.
211. Ibid at para 67.
212. Ibid at para 68.
213. Ibid at paras 49, 56.
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Part of what characterizes that history is the importance of Quebec’s 
distinctive civil law system to the historical relationship between the founding 
peoples. Article 8 of the Quebec Act, 1774 had guaranteed that “in all Matters 
of Controversy, relative to Property and Civil Rights, Resort shall be had to the 
Laws of Canada, as the Rule for the Decision of the same.”214 In 1866, just prior 
to Confederation, the Province of Canada had enacted the Civil Code of Lower 
Canada215 under the auspices of George-Étienne Cartier, the leading Father of 
Confederation from Quebec, and, as the Court noted, an opponent of a domestic 
general court of appeal.216 Preserving its distinctive civil legal system was an 
essential interest of Quebec in Confederation. The SCC noted in the Supreme 
Court Act Reference that the Macdonald government twice tried to introduce a 
general court of appeal without fixed seats from Quebec, and both attempts died 
on the order paper.217 The majority cited both the concerns of Henri-Thomas 
Taschereau, the Member of Parliament for Montmagny—that a general court 
of appeal for Canada would be dominated by common-law lawyers218—and the 
response, which suggested introducing a minimum number of Quebec judges.219
The majority had more difficulty directly connecting this history to the 
distinction between a former and current member of the Quebec bar.220 Part 
of the problem was the lack of a theory of the relevance of history. On a new 
originalist approach, such a theory would require showing that the parliamentary 
debates of the time shed light on the general public meaning of “from among” 
or “parmi,” and no such linkage was attempted.221 The Court paid a great deal of 
attention to the bargaining structure of the exchanges between the Macdonald 
and Mackenzie governments and Quebec MPs,222 and this may provide clues to 
the tacit theory of originalism it applied. But while the opinion gave great weight 
to history, it failed to explore how that weight should bear on today’s dispute.
Framing the adoption of section 6 as part of a bargain did, however, have a 
significant consequence in the rhetorical force of the opinion: It gave normative 
214. 14 Geo III, c 83, s 8 (UK).
215. An Act respecting the Civil Code of Lower Canada, LC 1865, c 41. The Civil Code was 
proclaimed into force 1 August 1866.
216. Supreme Court Act Reference, supra note 7 at para 77.
217. Ibid at para 79.
218. Ibid at para 50.
219. Ibid at paras 53-55.
220. As noted by Justice Moldaver in dissent, “To suggest that Quebec wanted to render ineligible 
former advocates of at least 10 years standing at the Quebec bar is to rewrite history. There is 
nothing in the historical debates that suggests any such thing.” Ibid at para 147.
221. See Supreme Court Act, supra note 159, s 6.
222. Supreme Court Act Reference, supra note 7 at paras 77-80.
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significance to what would otherwise be a purely technical exercise of statutory 
construction. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius has no great resonance, but 
Canadians value compromise—particularly linguistic and regional compromise. 
By giving normative weight to the 1875 legislative deal and to the April Accord 
of 1981, the SCC subtly included Quebec as a party to the constitutional order 
established in 1982, despite the province’s dramatic dissent in November 1981. 
Jurisprudentially, the Supreme Court Act Reference revealed both that the Court 
is open to historical approaches to interpretation, and that such approaches 
can form the basis of a more, rather than less, activist approach to enforcing 
constitutional provisions.223
B. THE SENATE REFORM REFERENCE
The Senate Reform Reference decision was released just over one month after the 
decision in the Supreme Court Act Reference. Once again, the SCC was asked to 
determine the kinds of changes the federal Parliament could make to a national 
institution without provincial consent, and once again the Court turned to an 
analysis of the political compromises of the past for answers. In the Senate Reform 
Reference, the federal government asked the Court to explain what amending 
procedure, if any, would be necessary to accomplish proposed changes to the 
Senate.224 Senators are currently “summoned” by the Governor General on the 
advice of the sitting Prime Minister.225 The text of the Constitution provides 
no process for election. Senators may serve until they reach the age of 75.226 
They must also meet property requirements.227
The first question in the reference asked how section 29 of the Constitution 
Act, 1867—which provides that Senate appointments continue until the Senator 
reaches the age of 75—could be amended to allow for fixed terms.228 The federal 
223. It might be objected that the 2014 References cannot be labelled “activist” because 
they involved struggles between governments, rather than involving limits imposed on 
government at the behest of a private individual or organization, as in a typical Charter 
or Aboriginal rights case. There is no universally accepted meaning of “judicial activism,” 
of course, but I would argue the 2014 References fit almost any definition. They seriously 
constrained the options of the federal government, without (in either case) enabling the 
provincial governments to do things on their own initiative. The Supreme Court Act Reference 
was precipitated by Rocco Galati as a private citizen, although his position was supported by 
the Attorney General of Quebec. See ibid.
224. Senate Reform Reference, supra note 8 at para 5.
225. Constitution Act, 1867, supra note 1, s 24.
226. Ibid, s 29(2).
227. Ibid, s 23(4).
228. Senate Reform Reference, supra note 8 at para 5.
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government argued that since any such change would not alter “the powers of 
the Senate and the method of selecting Senators” (which requires use of the 
general amending procedure under paragraph 42(1)(b) of the Constitution Act, 
1982),229 it was within the exclusive authority of Parliament under section 44.230 
The second and third questions asked whether Parliament could enact legislation 
for consultative elections in relation to the Senate, either on its own or by creating 
a framework for enactment by provincial and territorial legislatures.231 Since the 
proposed legislation would leave unchanged the provisions of the Constitution 
Act, 1867 relating to the summoning of Senators, the federal government argued 
that no constitutional amendment was required at all.232 The fourth question 
asked whether Parliament could alter the property qualifications of Senators 
under section 44.233 The fifth question asked whether abolition of the Senate 
would require unanimous consent or could be accomplished through the general 
amending formula.234 This was a difficult issue because of an ambiguity in section 
41, which provides for matters that can only be amended with unanimous 
consent.235 While this section does not explicitly refer to the Senate, it refers 
in paragraph (e) to any amendments to the amending formula itself, and the 
amending formula includes references to the Senate as an actor, albeit not a 
necessary actor, in the amending procedures.236
The Senate Reform Reference could not help but be argued and decided in 
the shadow of the pre-patriation Upper House Reference,237 which considered Bill 
C-60, a proposal of the Trudeau government to make changes to the Canadian 
Constitution under what was then subsection 91(1) of the BNA Act.238 Subsection 
91(1) gave Parliament authority to make laws in relation to “the amendment from 
time to time of the Constitution of Canada….”239 Part IV of Bill C-60 would 
have replaced the Senate with a “House of the Federation” with half its members 
229. Constitution Act, 1982, supra note 2, s 42(1)(b).
230. Senate Reform Reference, supra note 8 at para 51.
231. Ibid at para 5.
232. Ibid at para 66.
233. Ibid at para 5.
234. Ibid.
235. Constitution Act, 1982, supra note 2, s 41.
236. Ibid, s 41(e).
237. Supra note 53.
238. Constitutional Amendment Act, 1978 [Bill C-60]. For the first reading version, see Bayefsky, 
supra note 170, vol 1 at 344-413. The nature and powers of the House of the Federation 
were set out in clauses 62-70 of Bill C-60.
239. This section was amended by British North America (No 2) Act, 1949, 13 Geo VI, c 81 (UK). 
It was repealed by the Constitution Act, 1982, supra note 2, Schedule, Item 1.
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selected by the House of Commons and half by the provincial legislatures. Bill 
C-60 would also have changed the powers of the new Upper House.240 In the 
Upper House Reference, the SCC set out the principle that, despite the apparently 
broad wording of subsection 91(1), Parliament could not, on its own, change 
the “fundamental features” or “essential characteristics” of the Senate.241 In 
those days, before a domestic amending formula, such changes could only be 
accomplished by an Act of the Parliament of the United Kingdom—which, the 
SCC was to inform Canadians a year and a half later, required “a substantial 
degree of provincial consent” as a matter of constitutional convention, albeit not 
as a matter of constitutional law.242
The Upper House Reference set the baseline from which the provinces and 
federal government negotiated patriation in the following two years. During the 
patriation process, Senate reform proved too difficult, and the provisions of the 
1867 Constitution regarding the Senate were left unaltered. But, as in the case 
of the SCC, the amending formula provided some specific rules for changing the 
Constitution with respect to the Senate. Like the rest of the amending formula, 
these provisions derived from those in the April Accord, which were accepted by 
the Federal government (and its allied provinces of Ontario and New Brunswick) 
in November 1981.243
Section 44 of the Constitution Act, 1982—which replaced subsection 92(1) as 
it was between 1949 and 1982—says, “Subject to sections 41 and 42, Parliament 
may exclusively make laws amending the Constitution of Canada in relation to 
the executive government of Canada or the Senate and House of Commons.”244 
Strictly speaking, section 41 says nothing about the Senate, although paragraph 
(b) guarantees that the right of provinces to representation in the House of 
Commons at least equal to their representation in the Senate can only be changed 
by unanimous consent.245 Paragraph 42(b) provides that the general amending 
formula applies to amendments to the “Constitution of Canada” in relation to 
“the powers of the Senate and the method of selecting Senators.”246 As a matter of 
purely textual inference, therefore, it would seem that the Parliament of Canada 
240. See supra note 238, s 67 (allowing the House of Commons to refer bills directly to the 
Governor General after refusal by the Upper House); ibid, s 68 (allowing the House of 
Commons, with a two-thirds majority, to dispense with Upper House consideration).
241. Supra note 53 at 78.
242. Patriation Reference, supra note 130 at 808.
243. Romanow, Whyte & Leeson, supra note 199 at 208.
244. Supra note 2, s 44.
245. Ibid, s 41(b).
246. Ibid, s 42(b).
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could change any provision of the Constitution in relation to the Senate that 
was not in relation to its powers or the method of selecting Senators. And, if the 
Constitution were purely textual, Parliament could make any changes that did 
not require changing the constitutional text through ordinary legislation.
But this interpretation would imply that the Constitution Act, 1982 had 
altered the principles of the Upper House Reference, since it would appear to allow 
unilateral changes to the fundamental features and essential characteristics of the 
Senate—so long as they did not explicitly change the text of the Constitution in 
relation to its powers or methods of selection. Most of the provinces and territories 
argued that this approach could not be correct, but that the “fundamental features 
and essential characteristics” principle continued to operate or at least informed 
the interpretation of sections 42 and 44.247 On this provincialist view, section 
44 was subject to the same limits as the pre-patriation section 91(1), which was, 
according to the Upper House Reference, limited to “housekeeping” matters.248 
247. Reference re Senate Reform, 2014 SCC 32, [2014] 1 SCR 704 (Factum of the 
Intervenor Attorney General of Alberta at para 10), online: <http://www.scc-csc.ca/
WebDocuments-DocumentsWeb/35203/FM060_Intervener_Attorney-General-
of-Alberta.pdf>; ibid (Factum of the Intervenor Attorney General of Manitoba at 
para 12), online: <http://www.scc-csc.ca/WebDocuments-DocumentsWeb/35203/
FM020_Intervener_Attorney-General-of-Manitoba.pdf>; ibid (Factum of the 
Intervenor Attorney General of Newfoundland and Labrador at para 23), online: 
<http://www.scc-csc.ca/WebDocuments-DocumentsWeb/35203/FM030_Intervener_
Attorney-General-of-Newfoundland-and-Labrador.pdf>; ibid (Factum of the 
Intervenor Attorney General of Ontario at para 1), online: <http://www.scc-csc.ca/
WebDocuments-DocumentsWeb/35203/FM075_Intervener_Attorney-General-of-Ontario.
pdf>; ibid (Factum of the Intervenor Attorney General of Quebec at para 43), online: 
<http://www.scc-csc.ca/WebDocuments-DocumentsWeb/35203/FM085_Intervenant_
Procureur-G%C3%A9n%C3%A9ral-du-Qu%C3%A9bec.pdf>; ibid (Factum of the 
Intervenor Attorney General of Saskatchewan at para 71), online: <http://www.scc-csc.
ca/WebDocuments-DocumentsWeb/35203/FM095_Intervener_Attorney-General-for-
Saskatchewan.pdf>; ibid (Factum of the Intervenor Attorney General of Prince Edward 
Island at para 33), online: <http://www.scc-csc.ca/WebDocuments-DocumentsWeb/35203/
FM105_Intervener_Attorney-General-of-Prince-Edward-Island.pdf>; ibid (Factum of 
the Intervenor Attorney General of Nova Scotia at para 39), online: <http://www.scc-csc.
ca/WebDocuments-DocumentsWeb/35203/FM110_Intervener_Attorney-General-of-
Nova-Scotia.pdf>; ibid (Factum of the Intervenor Attorney General of British Columbia 
at para 6), online: <http://www.scc-csc.ca/WebDocuments-DocumentsWeb/35203/
FM130_Intervener_Attorney-General-of-British-Columbia.pdf>.
248. Supra note 53 at 65. Jean Chrétien, as Minister of Justice during the patriation process, gave 
evidence to the Special Joint Committee that the federal version of what became section 
44 was narrower than section 91(1). See Canada, Parliament, Minutes of Proceedings and 
Evidence of the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and of the House of Commons on the 
Constitution of Canada, iss 4 (Hull, Que: Supply and Services Canada, 1980) at 4:112-13.
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British Columbia referred to the bargaining dynamics of the patriation deal.249 
It argued that since the April Accord was a provincial proposal—accepted as a 
concession by the federal government in November—it could not have been 
intended to loosen the constraints on the unilateral power of amendment on the 
part of Parliament the provinces had established in the Upper House Reference.250 
The federal government made arguments both from the principle of democracy—
asserted in the Secession Reference251 and with which the existing Senate is difficult 
to square—and from the text.
The Court began its analysis with a strong claim that the Constitution was not 
limited to its text. It included not only the foundational principles of federalism, 
democracy, the protection of minorities, constitutionalism, and the rule of law—
as announced in the Secession Reference252—but also the “internal architecture” or 
“basic constitutional structure” assumed by the text.253 The corollary is that it is 
not always necessary to change the text to amend the Constitution and therefore 
to trigger the amending formula.254
The Court then turned to history. It noted the development of a pre-patriation 
practice, and then a convention, of “a substantial degree of provincial consent” 
for changes that directly affected federal-provincial relations.255 It was this practice 
that the April Accord and later Part V were designed to codify, in a manner 
that, unlike the rejected federal proposal, respected the juridical equality of the 
provinces.256 This historical background informed the Court’s critical conclusion 
that section 44 was intended to fulfill the same basic function as the pre-patriation 
subsection 92(1) discussed in the Upper House Reference.257 As with subsection 
92(1), section 44 does not allow alteration in “the fundamental nature and role of 
the institutions provided for in the Constitution.”258 From an ahistorical textual 
point of view, this does not make much sense, since section 44 on its own terms 
seems to incorporate any change to the Senate not expressly referred to in section 
249. Reference re Senate Reform, 2014 SCC 32, [2014] 1 SCR 704 (Factum of the Intervenor 
Attorney General of British Columbia at paras 36-41, 78-79), online: <http://www.scc-csc.
gc.ca/WebDocuments-DocumentsWeb/35203/FM130_Intervener_Attorney-General-of-
British-Columbia.pdf>.
250. Ibid at para 79.
251. Secession Reference, supra note 207.
252. Ibid at para 49.
253. Senate Reform Reference, supra note 8 at para 26.
254. Ibid at para 27.
255. Ibid at paras 29-30.
256. Ibid at para 31.
257. Ibid at paras 46-47.
258. Ibid at para 48.
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41 or 42. But it makes sense from a historical perspective. The final form of 
Part V derived largely from a provincialist proposal; the provincialists had won 
a victory in the Upper House Reference and they were not likely to give it away 
for nothing. If the dissenting provinces were trying to codify their victory in the 
Upper House Reference with what became Part V, then Parliament could do no 
more by itself in 2014 than it could before in 1979. The basic compromise of 
1867, as elucidated in 1979, remains until at least two-thirds of the provinces 
with a majority of the population agree otherwise.
The Court in the Senate Reform Reference returned to the well of the 
Confederation debates to draw out further historical aspects from 1867. 
Macdonald had noted that an elected upper house would likely come into greater 
conflict with an elected lower house.259 Thus, the lack of democratic legitimacy of 
the Senate was itself part of its design. This conclusion doomed the consultative 
elections.260 Senatorial tenure was also found to be part of the institution’s design 
and therefore a “fundamental feature” that could not be modified under section 
44—even though Parliament had modified tenure in 1965 by imposing an age 
limit of 75 years.261
Jurisprudentially, the Senate Reform Reference relies heavily on two of 
Bobbitt’s modalities—structure and history—at the expense of text. The Court 
was not interested in the federal government’s arguments from the principle of 
democracy (in Bobbitt’s terms, an “ethical” argument262), and instead regarded an 
attempt to make the Senate more democratic as precisely the kind of alteration 
that would rewrite the historic bargain.263 Indeed, despite the Court’s rhetorical 
emphasis on it, structure does not do much work, except on the final question of 
abolition. As the Australian example shows,264 a federal parliamentary democracy 
can function with an elected upper house, and there is no reason to think it could 
not function with an upper house with term limits. The real issue is not that these 
arrangements could not work with the structure of the Constitution, but that they 
were not the arrangements reached by the political actors behind Confederation. 
259. Ibid at para 58.
260. Ibid at para 63.
261. British North America Act, 1965, 14 Eliz II, c 4, pt 1 (Canada), s 1. See also Upper 
House Reference, supra note 53 at 65. The Court stated that this was an acceptable 
“housekeeping” amendment.
262. Supra note 122 at 13.
263. Senate Reform Reference, supra note 8 at paras 60-62.
264. An Act to constitute the Commonwealth of Australia 1900 (Cth), c 12, ss 7-9 (providing for an 
elected Senate).
(2016) 53 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL794
In the Senate Reform Reference, the Ancient Constitution won out not only over 
the Philosopher’s Constitution, but also over the Political Scientist’s.
Unfortunately, unlike in the case of the Supreme Court Act Reference, the 
Court’s historical analysis of the patriation process is skimpy—and in at least 
one case, factually mistaken. The Court claims, “Abolition of the Senate was not 
on the minds of the framers of the Constitution Act, 1982.”265 In fact, according 
to Roy Romanow, John Whyte, and Howard Leeson—key players in both the 
April Accord and the November 1981 deal—the New Democratic Party (NDP), 
at both provincial and federal levels, “had consistently urged [the Senate’s] total 
abolition.”266 This was significant both because the federal NDP was a close 
constitutional ally of the Trudeau government and because of the pivotal role of 
the NDP government in Saskatchewan—as a swing player between the federal 
government and its allies on the one hand and the more rejectionist provinces 
on the other.267 Clearly, the Saskatchewan government, if not the federal NDP, 
were among the “framers of the Constitution Act, 1982.” It was because Allan 
Blakeney, Saskatchewan’s premier, believed that the federal government had made 
unacceptable promises to the Senate that Saskatchewan sided with the Gang of 
Eight in the first place, despite Trudeau telling Blakeney, “[W]e will fight the 
Senate together.”268 The Liberal Party of Quebec (PLQ) also proposed abolition of 
the Senate in its “beige paper” released during the 1980 referendum campaign.269 
To be sure, the PLQ and NDP were only two political players in 1981–1982; 
the PLQ ultimately sided with Quebec’s Parti Québecois government to oppose 
the patriation package, and abolition was always unlikely.270 But it was hardly 
true, as the SCC claimed, that the possibility of abolition was not on the framers’ 
minds. This mistake does not seem to have been determinative of the result, 
but it shows the importance of a full historical record—which, in turn, suggests 
that the Court should be clear with potential litigants about what history is and 
is not relevant.
265. Senate Reform Reference, supra note 8 at para 101.
266. Romanow, Whyte & Leeson, supra note 199 at 127.
267. Ibid at 117 (describing Saskatchewan as the leader of the “moderate group”).
268. Ibid at 128.
269. The Constitutional Committee of the Quebec Liberal Party, A New Canadian Federation 
(Montreal: Quebec Liberal Party, 1980) at 47 (“Because this institution no longer seems 
to us to be adapted to the needs of a modern federal system, we propose that the Senate 
be abolished and that henceforth the federal Parliament be made up of only one body, the 
House of Commons”). Justice LeBel, one of the eight justices signing on to the Court’s 
opinion in the Senate Reform Reference, was co-author with André Tremblay of the first draft 
of this report. See ibid at 6.
270. Romanow, Whyte & Leeson, supra note 199 at 79-80.
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The deficiencies of the SCC’s historical account do not undermine the basic 
point that its decision makes sense—and only makes sense—as a vindication 
of the actual political compromise that led to the amending formula. Fixation 
of meaning by past political events is, by definition, originalism. But as with 
the Supreme Court Act Reference, there is no theorization of why the historic 
compromise is more important than arguments from text or democratic 
principle, or where the limits are. References to American debates could have 
helped because they could explain that historical fixation of intension comes first 
in analysis without necessarily being most important in determining the result.
V. CONCLUSION
The best arguments for the results in both 2014 References were historical ones, 
situating the texts of the 1867 Constitution, the Supreme Court Act, and the 
1982 amending formula in the political context at the times of their adoption. 
But this did not make the results deferential or conservative. Indeed, the result 
in both cases was a vigorous assertion of constitutional limits on the legislative 
powers of the federal Parliament. What implications do these cases have for 
Canadian constitutional methodology in general, and descriptive or normative 
originalism in particular?
The Court’s own methodological reflections on what it was doing are terse. 
In both cases, it claimed it was engaging in “broad and purposive” interpretation, 
informed by understanding the “linguistic, philosophic and historical context” of 
the Constitution.271 Both decisions referred specifically to Edwards,272 although 
the Court did not explicitly use the “living tree” metaphor. It would be claiming 
too much to say that the SCC’s focus on the history of enactment in these two 
References vindicates the descriptive-originalist claim that SCC judges have been 
new originalists all along without knowing it. It is possible to interpret the SCC’s 
use of history in purely pluralist terms. Despite some academic comments by 
originalists and anti-originalists alike, the Court has never eschewed Bobbitt’s 
historical modality altogether, as the references to it by Chief Justice Dickson 
attest. Even in the Motor Vehicle Act Reference, Justice Lamer allowed historical 
271. Supreme Court Act Reference, supra note 7 at para 19; Senate Reform Reference, supra note 8 at 
para 25. The phrase “linguistic, philosophic and historical context” comes from Chief Justice 
Dickson’s decision in Big M, supra note 133 at 344. This varies slightly from his formulation 
of “historical, political or philosophic context” in Hunter, supra note 4 at 155.
272. Supra note 17.
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evidence to be submitted, although he gave it little weight.273 Arguably, the 2014 
References just continued this tradition, which could be characterized as pluralist, 
pragmatic, or opportunist, depending on the evaluation of the observer.
Courts in general, and Canadian courts in particular, are more comfortable 
with a pluralist or pragmatic approach to methodology than anything more 
rigorous. This is particularly true to the extent that a particular methodology 
appears over-determinative and politically controversial. The problem with 
leaving it there, though, is that a purely pluralist account cannot shed light on 
when history should be used. If all that can be said is that there are a number of 
relevant factors of which history is one, then it becomes impossible to state what 
the law is when those factors are in conflict. While we should avoid a quixotic 
quest for a rigidly determinative method, lawyers, governments, and lower courts 
need to know at least the framework for analysis. This is particularly important for 
the amending formula, since it would be unfortunate if the already complicated 
constitutional negotiations always required SCC references to determine how 
change could be accomplished.
The new originalist literature provides a framework that can allow us to do 
more than simply assert that history is one factor that goes into the constitutional 
mixing bowl, without purporting to provide an implausibly strict constraint. 
Interpretation—a fundamentally historical-linguistic activity—comes before 
construction, an activity of making factual, moral, and prudential judgments 
constrained by precedent and the contours of adversarial litigation. This sequence, 
unlike unconstrained pluralism, provides an analytic framework for addressing 
the relationship between constitutional text and past political compromises—
one consistent with the approach of the Court in the 2014 References. At the 
same time, new originalism avoids constraining the development of case law with 
the concrete expectations of the framers about how cases should be decided. For 
the important constitutional provisions, it is principles, not rules, that are fixed.
To be sure, recent American scholarship on originalism can provide at most 
a general framework in which Canadian jurisprudential issues might be resolved. 
American originalists agree that, at some level of abstraction, the meaning of the 
US Constitution and its amendments was fixed at the time they were adopted, 
and that this meaning provides some constraint on what a court may legitimately 
decide under those provisions. But there is no consensus on how that meaning 
might be determined in practice, how constraining it is, or what should be done 
when the original meaning fails to provide sufficient guidance.
273. Supra note 73 at 505-09.
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American imports have long inspired Canadian anxiety. This was manifestly 
the case with the old originalism that grew out of the battles over the legacy 
of the Warren Court in the 1980s.274 But as our constitutional jurisprudence 
matures—especially to the extent it focuses on structural features—we need 
sophisticated tools for navigating the relationship between the historical-political 
context in which the provisions of the Constitution arose and their application 
to contemporary controversies. Once we get past the anxiety, we may see that one 
reason for considering a sophisticated originalism is precisely that it Canadianizes 
our Constitution by rooting it in our own history.
The project of a native Canadian originalism is obviously beyond the scope 
of a single article. A reader who accepts the philosophical arguments of new 
originalism—that the meaning of unamended but amendable legal texts must 
be fixed but not determinative—and that these arguments shed light on how the 
SCC could have resolved the issues in the 2014 References will inevitably have 
further questions. The most passionate parts of the American discourse relate to 
the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment. What are the implications of 
new originalism for rights claims in Canada? To the extent that contemporary 
forms of originalism disclaim determinateness, how useful are they? Is there 
anything specific to the Canadian constitutional tradition that shines light 
on intra-originalist debates? How can the sometimes abstruse philosophical 
distinctions between meaning and reference (let alone extension and intension) 
be translated into terminology Canadian lawyers can use? What lessons does the 
historical record of our major constitutional moments actually have for us now? 
Assuming that originalist arguments in some cases do point in a specific direction, 
when would that be a normatively sound reason for departing from established 
precedent? To state these questions is to state that there is a research program 
ahead for Canadian new orginalists. It is in the nature of such programs that they 
cannot establish their payoff ahead of time. The project has just begun.275
For now, I hope only to have shown that there is reason to think that it is worth 
pursuing a more philosophically informed approach to our legal history and a more 
historically informed approach to our constitutional jurisprudence. Our central 
institutions, particularly the Senate, are controversial. But they are ours because 
274. See Beatty, Constitutional Law, supra note 5; Binnie, supra note 15; Hogg, Constitutional 
Law, 5th, supra note 15; Motor Vehicle Act Reference, supra note 73.
275. Kerri Froc has initiated the project of bringing a new-originalist perspective to bear in 
relation to section 15 and the typically-ignored-but-historically-important section 28 of the 
Charter. See Froc, supra note 25.
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they derive from the ”thousand acts of accommodation”276 that allowed a nation 
of religious, linguistic, regional, and juristic diversity to coexist within a single (if 
complicated) legal order. Philosophy can help us think through the importance 
of the political compromises at the time of adoption to current disputes about the 
application of text. But only that history itself can explain why our institutions 
are ours. Arguments from universal normative principles will never resolve 
institutional details, which must be a product of contingency and compromise. 
While there is much scholarly work on Canadian constitutional history and on 
current doctrinal issues, we have yet to develop a systematic way of relating them to 
each other. But as an SCC justice remarked in 1926, if the Canadian Constitution 
is a living tree, political compromise between Canada’s parts is its “native soil.”277 
It is time for Canadian constitutional theorists to get their hands dirty.
276. Secession Reference, supra note 207 at para 96 (quoting the oral submissions of the Attorney 
General of Saskatchewan).
277. References re The Weekly Rest in Industrial Undertakings Act, The Minimum Wages Act, and The 
Limitation of Hours of Work Act, [1936] SCR 461 at 519, Cannon J, dissenting.
